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DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS AND WORKING MEMORY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF ACUTE STRESS 
 
Lauren M. Vines 
July 1, 2014 
The neuropsychological domain of working memory and the nearly 3000 year-old 
Buddhist construct of mindfulness appear to be disparate concepts. However, the 
measurable decline of working memory capacity (WMC) under stress, in combination 
with  the stress-reducing and attention-focusing effects of mindfulness suggest potential 
augmentation of working memory through the engagement of mindful practice. A 
theoretical process through which dispositional mindfulness exerts a moderating effect on 
WMC reduction following an acute stressor is proposed.  
To investigate processes within this theoretical framework, a sample of undergraduate 
college students (N = 67) were assessed across various measures, including level of 
dispositional mindfulness, affective state, WMC, and physiological indices. Participants 
were then presented with an acute emotional stressor, in the form of death and injury 
images of the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2005). Following stress induction, participants were reassessed for WMC and affective 
changes. Scores on affective measures underwent significant changes from pre- to post-
stressor in the predicted direction, while scores on a measure of WMC increased, in 
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contrast to a priori predictions. Dispositional mindfulness was not found to play a 
mediational role in affective, cognitive, or physiological changes from pre- to post-
stressor. Implications of analyses for the present study, as well as for future research, are 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 Viktor Frankl, a psychiatrist and survivor of Nazi concentration camps, once 
wrote that “between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to 
choose our response” (2006). Frankl was eloquently referring to the human ability to 
thoughtfully respond to a stimulus, rather than physiologically react in a reflexive 
manner. But how exactly does one access this space? And why, in exigent moments when 
a situation threatens an individual’s physical, mental, or emotional integrity, does this 
space seems to shrink or appear non-existent, triggering reflexive fight, flight, or freeze 
patterns of behavior rather than measured, rational responses? These questions are not 
only philosophically intriguing, but have implications for understanding human behavior 
in acutely stressful situations as well as individual differences which affect whether the 
behavior involves a reflexive reaction or measured response.  This paper addresses these 
questions by exploring the relationship between two theoretically distinct yet potentially 
interlinked constructs: the neuropsychological construct of working memory and the 
construct of mindfulness, a facet of insight meditation described 2500 years ago in 
Buddhist texts and characterized by non-judgmental, present moment awareness (Wallace 
& Shapiro, 2006). A thorough review of the literature concerning these two constructs 
reveals numerous studies which have begun to explore their relationship; however, the 
research is primarily correlational. Additionally, the majority of such research has 
examined these constructs within the context of chronic stress. For example, the work of 
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Stanley and Jha, has examined the relationship between mindfulness and working 
memory in a cohort of Marines during the highly stressful, pre-deployment phase of their 
training (Stanley, Schaldach, Kiyonaga, & Jha, 2011). Mindfulness as a clinical 
intervention was originally developed for use in medical patients experiencing chronic 
stress (Kabat-Zinn, 1990); however, recent research suggests a mindful state is equally 
beneficial in the context of an acute stressor, which can quickly reduce working memory 
capacity and alter cognitive functioning. In an effort to identify the space between 
stimulus and response following an acutely stressful stimulus, this paper a) reviews the 
extant literature concerning mindfulness and working memory; and b) proposes a novel, 
theoretical process through which mindful awareness may enhance working memory 
following an acute stressor.   
Mindfulness 
 The concept of “mindfulness” has received much attention in clinical practice and 
research, empirical studies and scientific inquiry over the past two decades. Originating 
in Eastern philosophy and Buddhist meditation (for a detailed discussion, see Rosch, 
2007), a modern definition of mindfulness denotes full and non-judgmental openness to 
present-moment experiences (Kabat-Zinn, 2003) which exists in humans as a 
dispositional aptitude which can be enhanced with training and maintained though 
practice (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). While this definition of the construct 
is generally accepted in the literature, operational definitions of mindfulness vary and 
there has yet to be a consensus on one operational definition, particularly in the context of 





 Benefits of mindfulness. As interest in mindfulness has increased, so has 
evidence of its salutary effects. Suggested benefits of mindfulness for those experiencing 
mental disorders, chronic health conditions, and non-clinical samples include affect 
tolerance (Fulton, 2005), increased objectivity (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Leary & 
Tate, 2007; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006), improved concentration 
(Young, 1997), and higher levels of emotional intelligence (Walsh & Shapiro, 2006). 
Additionally, mindfulness has been proposed to increase effectiveness of emotion 
regulation (Corcoran, Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2010; Farb et al., 2010). Emotion 
regulation refers to the process by which aspects of an emotional experience are modified 
or modulated in some form (Gross; 1998); with modifications taking place through 
physiological, behavioral, and cognitive means (Bridges, Denham, & Ganiban, 2004). 
This process is an integral facet of mental health and its dysregulation can cause severe 
impairment in adaptive functioning, as seen by the multitude of mental disorders which 
include emotion dysregulation as a primary symptom (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). The literature base concerning emotion regulation is large, and continually 
growing (Koole, 2009; for a complete review of the construct, see Gross, 2007). Specific 
to mindfulness, emotion regulation refers to the “capacity to remain mindfully aware at 
all times, irrespective of the apparent valence or magnitude of any emotion that is 
experienced” (Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009, p. 569). This ability is purportedly 
cultivated through the systematic training of awareness and non-reactivity to emotional 
experiences during mindful practice (Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009). The potential 





clinical populations since, as previously mentioned, emotion dysregulation is a symptom 
of many mental disorders.     
 As a treatment for mental disorders, mindfulness based interventions (MBIs) have 
been found to be particularly effective for individuals suffering from anxiety and 
depression. For example, a meta-analysis of 39 studies in which participants received a 
MBI for a variety of psychiatric and medical conditions focused specifically on 
symptoms of anxiety and depression (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010). Results 
indicated robust effect sizes associated with MBIs provided to subjects with anxiety and 
mood disorders which were maintained over follow-up. In regards to MBIs for chronic 
physical conditions, the effect of mindfulness on individuals with chronic pain has been 
the subject of multiple empirical studies. A recent review of ten empirical studies of 
MBIs for chronic pain found these interventions produced nonspecific effects for the 
reduction of pain symptoms and pain-related depressive symptoms (Chiesa & Serretti, 
2011). However, due to the small sample size and lack of randomization in the majority 
of these studies, the review was unable to demonstrate MBIs to be more efficacious than 
other interventions such as support and educational groups. Additionally, the effects of 
MBIs focused on stress reduction have also been studied in psychologically healthy 
populations. Chiesa and Serretti (2009) found in a recent meta-analysis of 10 controlled 
and randomized controlled studies of MBIs provided to healthy subjects, there was a 
significant, positive nonspecific effect compared to wait list controls. These results were 
maintained even when the randomized controlled studies were analyzed separately. 





majority of samples were composed of female, Caucasian undergraduate students, further 
limiting the generalizability of results (Chiesa & Serretti, 2009). While meta-analyses of 
MBIs do consistently identify limitations regarding sampling and study design, overall 
results suggest significant benefits of MBIs for both clinical and non-clinical populations.    
 Aside from its benefits for various populations, the efficacy of mindfulness for 
stress reduction has been demonstrated in multiple studies (Birnie, Garland, & Carlson, 
2010; Chang, et al., 2004; Chiesa & Serretti, 2009; Shapiro, et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
MBIs which have emerged over recent years are implicated in the reduction of stress for 
both physical and mental disorders (Carmody & Baer, 2008; Witkiewitz & Bowen, 
2010). One of the most investigated mindfulness interventions is Mindfulness–Based 
Stress Reduction (MBSR), a clinical program originally developed by Jon Kabat-Zinn to 
reduce stress in medically ill patients through systematic training in mindfulness 
meditation (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). The MBSR program consists of 8 to 10 group sessions, 
which contain training in mindfulness techniques and education about the 
psychophysiology of stress and emotions (Santorelli, 1999). Participants are asked to 
engage in formal and informal meditation practices outside of the group sessions (for a 
more detailed discussion, see Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Grossman and colleagues (2004) 
conducted a comprehensive review of 64 studies in which MBSR and other MBIs were 
used to treat stress due to chronic health conditions. Among the twenty studies which met 
criteria for the final meta-analysis, medical diagnoses of participants ranged from 
fibromyalgia, various forms of cancer, and coronary artery disease to various forms of 





the meta-analysis showed consistently strong effect sizes, despite the wide variety of 
samples. Grossman and colleagues suggested such results indicate mindfulness may 
enhance more general processes related to coping under stress both in daily and atypical 
situations. Of the studies included in the analysis, a significant limitation was the absence 
of post-treatment follow-up. As a result, this meta-analysis was only able to comment on 
the immediate effects of MBIs. A recent review of randomized control trials of MBSR 
found that compared to control groups, MBSR treatment was more likely to reduce self-
reported levels of anxiety, depression, anger, rumination, general psychological distress, 
and increase positive affect, self-compassion, and overall quality of life (Keng, Smoski, 
& Robins, 2011).  
 Proposed models of mindfulness. As the number of studies investigating the 
effects of mindfulness has grown, so has interest in the proposed mechanisms through 
which these effects are engendered. Multiple models exist in the extant literature, with 
each model suggesting various mechanisms of change. For example, some proposed 
mechanisms focus on changes in cognitive activity, such as increased awareness of 
metacognitions (Teasdale et al. 2002), the ability to re-perceive (Shapiro et al. 2006), and 
decreased rumination (Deyo et al. 2009; Corcoran, Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2010).  
Others suggest mediators involving attentional processes including an increased ability to 
focus attention or alternatively engage in open monitoring (Lutz et al. 2008). Holzel and 
colleagues (2011) have proposed a multifaceted process through which various 
mechanisms of mindfulness interact to produce benefits. These mechanisms include 





exposure, and a change in self-perspective. Moreover, Holzel asserts that certain 
mechanisms may play a greater role in the overall process than others on a moment by 
moment basis within the mindful experience (Holzel et al., 2011). An additional model of 
mindfulness has been proposed by Bishop and colleagues (2004), with two over-arching 
components. In Bishop’s model, the first component involves attention regulation, which 
allows the individual to maintain their focus on the immediate, present moment 
experience. Bishop additionally proposes that the first component of attention regulation 
contains two types of mental skills; sustained attention skills and switching skills. Skills 
in sustained attention allow an individual to maintain focus on a specific present moment 
experience and avoid distractions from transient thoughts, feelings, and sensations. 
Alternately, switching skills refer to the ability to return to the desired point of attention 
once distraction occurs (Bishop et al., 2004); for example, a practitioner of mindfulness 
would demonstrate switching when he or she redirects attention from a distracting 
thought back to the here-and-now experience of the breath. Attention regulation is then 
followed by the second component of the model, which is an open, curious orientation 
toward one’s experiences. This attitudinal component is hypothesized to lead to 
reductions in experiential avoidance, increases in trait openness, and improved affect 
tolerance (Bishop et al., 2004). 
 Critiques of mindfulness. Just as proposed mechanisms for change related to 
mindfulness practice have begun to emerge, so have critiques of mindfulness and its 
related field of research. Grossman (2008; 2011) has published several critiques of 





of Grossman’s recent critiques is the lack of gold-standard measures with which to assess 
an individual’s level of mindfulness, despite the existence of multiple self-report 
inventories (Grossman, 2011). Examples of such self-report measures frequently used in 
empirical studies include the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & 
Ryan, 2003), the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith, & 
Allen, 2004), the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale (CAMS; Feldman, Hayes, 
Kumar, & Greeson, 2004; Hayes & Feldman, 2004), and the Philadelphia Mindfulness 
Scale (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). While good internal 
consistencies have been found for each of these measures (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer, 
Smith, & Allen, 2004; Feldman et al., 2004; Baer et al., 2006; Cadaciotto et al., 2008), 
most of these inventories have been validated solely in samples of undergraduate college 
students; Grossman (2011) has identified this as a weakness in their psychometric 
construction. However, Brown and colleagues have countered this criticism by 
suggesting that measures such as the MAAS have been developed to measure 
mindfulness as it occurs in individuals without meditation experience, justifying their use 
of college samples for initial validation (Brown, Ryan, Loverich, Biegel, & West, 2011). 
 Additionally, Grossman notes the lack of a gold-standard measure with which to 
assess an individual’s level of mindfulness, in contrast to a multitude of self-report 
inventories (Grossman, 2011). Grossman asserts that without a gold-standard measure, it 
is not possible to assess the construct validity the existing mindfulness questionnaires. 
Developers of mindfulness questionnaires have countered that at this early stage in 





validity of existing mindfulness measures, rather than waiting for a gold-standard 
measure to appear (Brown, Ryan, Loverich, Biegel, & West, 2011). Additionally, good 
convergent validity has been found between the previously mentioned scales (Baer et al., 
2006), and criterion validity of scales such as the MAAS have been supported through 
consistent associations with behavioral, physiological, and neurological outcomes 
(Brown et al., 2011).  
 Another critique by Grossman is that current mindfulness measures may assess 
qualities quite different from the original Buddhist characterization of mindfulness, and 
do not take into account elements of mindfulness such as intention, tolerance, compassion 
and kindness, and ethical behavior (Grossman, 2008; Grossman, 2011). An analysis of 
current mindfulness literature suggests that Grossman is correct in his assertion that 
empirical research of mindfulness utilizes a Western adaptation of the original Buddhist 
construct. However, it is also worth noting that Buddhist literature and scholars have 
never reached a complete consensus on the exact definition of the construct themselves 
(Grossman, 2008).   
 Other critiques of research related to mindfulness research include non-
randomized samples, a heavy self-selection bias, and the difficulty of creating a double-
blind condition inherent to meditation studies (Chiesa & Serretti, 2010). Chiesa and 
Serriti (2010) suggest the latter limitation might be overcome, to some extent, through the 
use of a single-blind design, and note that this strategy has already been applied in some 
recent studies. Additional critiques have noted a lack of attention paid to participant 





suggested preexisting personality traits may influence recruitment and compliance 
particularly in MBIs, and individual differences in attention may influence the ability to 
utilize mindfulness practice in a manner which alleviates stress. 
 Current controversies: Trait or state? As previously mentioned, a current 
criticism of mindfulness is the varied operational definitions within its body of research. 
Within these varied definitions, certain discrepancies exist as to the particular qualities of 
this “deceptively simple concept” (Brown & Ryan, 2004, p. 242). One such discrepancy 
is whether mindfulness exists as a state induced through mindful practice, or as a trait-
like dispositional quality, consistent across situations. An analysis of literature 
concerning this discrepancy suggests the distinction between mindfulness as a state or 
trait is subtle. For example, Kabat-Zinn (2003) has suggested that the ability to be 
mindful exists in all individuals to varying degrees, and that formal mindfulness practice 
can increase this ability. As such, sitting meditation may create a state of mindfulness by 
regulating attention in a particular way (Bishop et al., 2004). This state dissolves when 
attention ceases to be regulated in this particular fashion (Bishop et al., 2004), with the 
amount of mindfulness experienced during the practice dependent on the capacity for 
mindfulness present in the practitioner. Thus, even though mindfulness is framed as an 
experiential state, both Kabat-Zinn (2003) and Bishop (2004) additionally suggest the 
existence of a necessary capacity to engage in non-judgmental, present moment focus 
before the state can be experienced. Alternatively, Brown and Ryan (2003) have 





mindfulness is an innate attentional quality present in all individuals and independent 
from formal mindfulness practice.  
 The trait concept of mindfulness described by Brown and Ryan (2003) suggests a 
spectrum along which individual differences lie, with consistent mindful attention at the 
high end of the spectrum and habitual, automatic thinking, at the low end (Langer, 1989). 
Moreover, while Brown and Ryan concede that mindfulness is "inherently a state of 
consciousness" (2003, p. 824), they and others assert that trait-like tendencies exist in 
regards to the frequency with which this state of consciousness is experienced (see 
Brown et al., 2007; Brown & Cordon, 2009; Brown & Ryan, 2003). For example, an 
individual with a high capacity for the experience of mindfulness may not bring a non-
judgmental attitude and focused awareness to every moment, but may be likely to do so 
with greater frequency than an individual with a low capacity for mindfulness.  
 This conceptualization of innate or dispositional mindfulness is similar to the 
conceptualization of positive and negative affect by Watson, Tellegen and colleagues (see 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), who suggested 
that while positive and negative affect states can be induced in all individuals, individual 
differences occur in the capacity for each form of affect, with some individuals primed to 
experience greater amounts of positive or negative affect than others. Similarly, recent 
research on dispositional mindfulness has demonstrated that individuals with no formal 
meditation practice display varied individual differences in their responses to self-report 
measures of mindful awareness (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 2003; 





 Based on an analysis of the previously discussed literature, trait-like or 
dispositional mindfulness in this manuscript will be operationally defined as an 
individual’s capacity for and frequency of a non-judgmental, present-moment attentional 
focus during daily life. Additionally, while there are several terms used in mindfulness 
literature to describe a trait-like capacity for mindful experience, such as trait 
mindfulness, everyday mindfulness, innate mindfulness and dispositional mindfulness, 
this paper will utilize the latter terminology to describe individual differences in mindful 
experience. Although dispositional mindfulness and trait mindfulness are both widely 
used by current researchers of the construct, the term "trait" is also used to describe stable 
aspects of personality; while mindfulness has been linked to certain core personality traits 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Bishop et al., 2005; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & 
Toney, 2006), this paper is primarily concerned with a general tendency toward mindful 
awareness rather than personality attributes. Therefore, the innate aspect of mindfulness 
which exists outside of formal practice while henceforth be referred to as dispositional 
mindfulness (DM). 
 As previously mentioned, criticisms of mindfulness include the absence of a gold-
standard measure and the subsequent inability to determine the construct validity of 
mindfulness questionnaires (Grossman, 2001). This criticism extends to measures used to 
determine levels of DM. Grossman (2001) has suggested that self-report trait mindfulness 
questionnaires may measure qualities quite different than those present during a state of 
formal meditation. This paper recognizes these limitations, and agrees with Grossman 





physiological experiences, thought to be related to DM. While limitations exist in the 
measurement of DM, they are not grounds for its dismissal as a construct, but rather 
future areas of expansion for the field. Additionally, Grossman is likely correct that DM 
is not synonymous with the experience of formal mindfulness practice. In fact, there is a 
recent study which supports this view; Thompson and Waltz (2007) found no relationship 
between DM and mindfulness induced through a brief sitting meditation in a large sample 
of individuals with no previous meditation experience. However, an analysis of the 
previously mentioned DM literature does provide a theoretical foundation for the 
experience of mindful awareness outside of formal practice. 
 Operational definition of mindfulness relevant to cognitive processes.  As 
reviewed earlier, mindfulness research is still in an early stage and operational definitions 
of the construct differ with each study. However, for the purposes of this manuscript, 
mindfulness is defined as the experience of sustained, nonjudgmental attention towards 
both internal and external events, based on the two component model of Bishop and 
colleagues (2004). Furthermore, this particular manuscript will consider mindfulness as a 
dispositional attribute, with the level of this disposition present determining the frequency 
with which this particular state of consciousness is experienced (Brown et al., 2007; 
Brown & Cordon, 2009; Brown & Ryan, 2003). While other models of mindfulness exist, 
the simplicity of the two component model proposed by Bishop and colleagues allows for 
integration with cognitive processes such as working memory. Moreover, defining 
mindfulness as a dispositional attribute similarly allows for integration and comparison 





(Illkowska & Engle, 2010). Additionally, an analysis of literature concerning models of 
mindfulness suggest that multi-component processes such as the model suggested by 
Holzel and colleagues (2011) may be contained within over-arching components of 
attention and a nonjudgmental attitude. Lastly, the Bishop model appears to most closely 
reflect the original Kabat-Zinn definition of mindfulness, “paying attention in a particular 
way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4), 
which is closely related to the original Buddhist construct (Grossman, 2011). The two 
components of this model, attention and non-judgment, will now be examined in terms of 
their relationship to cognitive processes which may sustain or enhance mental resiliency 
following an acute stressor.  
 Attention. Outside of mindfulness research, there is a voluminous amount of 
literature pertaining to the cognitive process of attention. Specific to mindfulness, 
attention is described as the conscious awareness of internal and external stimuli as they 
occur in the present moment, and involves a self-regulatory process through which one’s 
attention is constantly redirected towards present moment experiences (Bishop et al., 
2004). An illustration of this can be found in formal mindfulness practice, during which 
practitioners focus their attention on a particular stimulus, such as the breath. At any time 
a practitioner finds attention has become unfocused, she or he would return the focus to 
the breath. For example, instructions for mindfulness meditation often include the 
following: “Focus your entire attention on your incoming and outgoing breath. Try to 
sustain your attention there without distraction. If you get distracted, calmly return your 





 Once a stimulus becomes strong enough to cross the attentional threshold needed 
for an individual to detect its presence, a rapid process quickly follows; the stimulus is 
evaluated as ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘neutral’ as a result of prior conditioning (Brown, Ryan, & 
Creswell, 2007).  Such rapid categorization may be influenced and aided by cognitive 
schemas, previously established beliefs, and automatic labels or judgments. For example, 
a physiological experience of anxiety, such as a rapid heartbeat might arise during 
mindfulness meditation. Once the sensation is detected, a novice practitioner may quickly 
evaluate it as “bad”, having previously been conditioned to experience this sensation as 
distressing. However, the impartiality emphasized by attitudinal components of 
mindfulness aid in the redirection of attention back to the present moment focus and 
reduces habitual, automatic cognitive reactions (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). In this manner, a 
mindful individual upon experiencing external or internal events would operate from a 
position of “pure” attention, or simply “noticing”, rather than engaging in reflexive 
elaboration of the experience through judgments and labels. Thus, the selective attention 
of an individual engaging in mindfulness is fully focused without intrusions of 
comparisons, categorizations, evaluations, or ruminative thoughts (Marks, Sobanski, & 
Hine, 2010). This focused attention has been hypothesized as the process through which 
long-term mindful practitioners experience cortical changes, evidenced by functional 
brain imaging, and associated with greater attentional capacity than novice practitioners 
or individuals with no mindfulness experience (Kilpatrick, et al., 2011; Pagnoni & Cekic, 





mindfulness, the manner in which attention is brought to the present moment is also 
important and deserves equal consideration.  
 Non-judgment.  The idea that the quality of attention is just as important as the 
act of focusing one’s attention is considered a primary foundation of mindfulness (Kabat-
Zinn, 1990). For example, an individual might focus attention on present moment 
experiences but in a critical, judgmental manner (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 
2006), or attention may be focused with qualities of openness and warm curiosity (Kabat-
Zinn, 2003); such differences are hypothesized to influence an individual’s affective and 
cognitive experience of moment-by-moment sensory input (Bishop, et al., 2006). The act 
of “being present” with external and internal experiences without “condemning, 
criticizing, shaming, or rejecting” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 203) represents the mindful quality 
of non-judgment. Similarly, non-judging may also be conceptualized as acceptance of 
present-moment experiences (Bishop, et al., 2006), which provides a context for internal 
events to be viewed as transient, observable experiences rather than concrete events 
requiring an immediate reaction. Specifically, open acceptance provides a mechanism 
through which thoughts, physical sensations, and affective responses are observed as 
events, rather than experienced with the elaboration of categorical judgments (Walach et 
al., 2006) or labels such “this experience is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Giluk, 2009). Such 
elaboration on inner experiences reduces contact with the present moment, as it directs 
the individual’s focus inward towards cognitive events and away from the experience of 
the here and now (Giluk, 2009). This specific attitudinal orientation is described by 





with attention and intention into a simultaneous cycle of awareness such that a mindful 
state cannot occur without openness and curiosity.         
 The importance of a non-judgmental attitude towards present moment experiences 
is particularly apparent in instances where it is excluded from the act of attention towards 
inner emotional experiences. For example, individuals suffering from anxiety disorders 
often present with various somatic, cognitive, and emotional symptoms triggered by a 
threatening stimuli. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is one such condition, occurring 
in the form of re-experiencing, hyper-arousal, and avoidant symptoms (APA, 2000), all 
of which are highly distressing. Research suggests traumatized individuals who make 
cognitive evaluations or judgments about these symptoms, concluding something is 
wrong rather than accepting them as part of the natural pattern of healing post-trauma, are 
more likely to develop PTSD than those who did not make such evaluations (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2011). In contrast, Shapiro and colleagues (2006) suggest that attention coupled 
with an attitude of openness and acceptance allows anxiety to be viewed as an 
impermanent inner state, one that may be unpleasant but will pass with time, thus 
allowing for greater tolerance of anxiety and fewer avoidant coping strategies, such as 
substance use or thought suppression (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). A 
non-judgmental attitudinal orientation allows inner experiences to be treated as sources of 
information for enhanced decision making and self-regulation (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, 
& Freedman, 2006) rather than objects of fear, providing a mechanism by which a 





 Both a non-judgmental attitude and focused attention play important roles in the 
creation and maintenance of a mindful experience. Analysis of these two components 
reveals the complementary nature of mindfulness to certain cognitive processes. For 
example, focused attention on specific stimuli precedes the encoding and storage of these 
stimuli into short-term memory (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007) while working in concert 
with the mind’s mental sketch-board, a functional domain known as working memory. 
Working memory is particularly prone to reduction in its ability to hold and protect 
information against distractions when an individual is cognitively compromised, due to 
either environmental stress or symptoms of mental distress (de Kloet, Joëls, & Holsboer, 
2005; Joorman & Gotlib, 2008). This aspect of working memory coupled with the pure 
attention resultant from a mindful state has encouraged the development of theoretical 
hypotheses suggesting augmentation of working memory capacity through the 
engagement of mindful practice (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008;  Jha, Stanley, & Baime, 
2010; Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010). In order to better understand the 
clinical implications of this theory, a thorough investigation of the importance of working 
memory to cognitive and affective functioning is warranted.      
Working Memory Capacity (WMC) 
 Working memory capacity (WMC) has been operationally defined as the capacity 
to maintain and manipulate goal-relevant information over brief periods of time by 
shielding it from goal-irrelevant stimuli (Conway et al., 2005; Engle, 2002; Baddeley, 
2003); WMC is “critical for surviving and thriving in complex, ever-changing, and 





capacity limited construct in which information is stored and then processed; it was 
initially considered to be solely involved in the storage of temporary, short-term memory 
(Baddeley & Hitchm 1974). However, more recent studies suggest WMC may in fact 
involve both long-term and short-term memory (Baddeley, 2003; Unsworth & Engle, 
2007). Additionally, WMC operates as one of the cognitive functions by which central 
executive functioning is enabled (Miyake et al., 2000), thereby making higher order 
cognition possible. However, working memory is but one component of executive 
functioning, which has been defined as “the dimension of human behavior that deals with 
‘how’ behavior is expressed” (Lezak, 1983, as cited in Jurado & Roselli, 2007, p. 213). 
According to Miyake and colleagues (2000), two other basic executive functions exist, 
which are inhibition (the ability to “deliberately inhibit dominant, automatic…responses 
when necessary”; Miyake et al., 2000, p. 57) and mental set shifting (the ability to shift 
attention between multiple tasks). Cognitive behaviors mediated by executive functions 
are those high-level abilities typically attributed to the prefrontal regions of the brain 
(Stuss et al., 2002), such as verbal reasoning, problem solving, inhibition, and initiation 
and monitoring of actions (Chan, Shum, Toulpoulou, & Chen, 2008). Overarching 
components of executive functions include goal formation, goal-related planning, 
behaviors associated with goal-directed plans, and effectual performance of those plans 
(Lezak, 1983). Due to its importance in the understanding of human cognition and 
behavior, a vast amount of literature covers the topic of executive functioning, much of 
which is outside the scope of this manuscript (for a recent review, see Jurado & Rosselli, 





 As an executive function, WMC is theorized to be a predictor of fluid 
intelligence, a significant factor in the performance of an assortment of cognitive 
activities (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).  WMC is also responsible for 
cognitive flexibility, which is achieved by protecting behavioral goals from competing 
stimuli while concurrently monitoring for goal relevant information (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). The neurological mechanisms underlying WMC and cognitive flexibility are, as 
previously mentioned, found within the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Mansouri, Tanaka, & 
Buckely, 2009). However, studies of the PFC have indicated this brain structure to be 
quite susceptible to the effects of both acute and chronic stress (Arnsten, 2007). 
Moreover, WMC’s ability to protect relevant information from irrelevant or distracting 
sensory input appears to suffer as a result of stress (Wegner & Erber, 1992).     
  It has been theorized that WMC involves a combination of both trait and state 
aspects (Ilkowska & Engle, 2010), so while stressful environments may be deleterious to 
WMC in all individuals (Evans & Schamberg, 2009; Vasterling et al., 2006), some may 
possess higher baseline WMC in such situations. Indeed, recent research on individual 
differences in WMC has demonstrated low WMC to be associated with increases in 
emotionally intrusive thoughts, risk of substance abuse, and risk of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and other anxiety disorders, (Brewin & Smart, 2005; Schmeichel, 
Volokhov, & Demeree, 2008), as well as greater overall psychiatric dysfunction 
(Unsworth, Heitz, & Engle, 2005). Additionally, individuals with low WMC have been 
found to be more likely to report mind wandering during a task requiring focused 





report mind wandering during breath focused meditations (Jha et al., 2010). In contrast, 
individuals high in WMC have been found to be more successful at emotion regulation 
(Schmiechel & Demeree, 2010); interestingly, individuals with higher levels of trait 
mindfulness have similarly displayed more adaptive emotional functioning and higher 
levels of emotional intelligence than individuals low in trait mindfulness (Baer et al., 
2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003), skills which involve regulatory components such as 
recognition of emotional cues effective and management of affective responses (Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2008). Indeed, a recent study found higher levels of trait mindfulness 
were associated with higher trait levels of emotional intelligence as well as higher levels 
of positive affect and lower levels of negative affect (Schutte & Malouff, 2011).  
 Self-regulatory processes in general have also been linked to working memory. In 
one study, setting a self-regulatory goal of not consuming candy successfully guided 
consumption in individuals with high WMC, but not those low in WMC (Hofmann, et al., 
2008). The authors of this study suggested that individuals high in WMC might be more 
able to engage in goal-directed behaviors guided by self-regulatory goals. However, 
much of the previously reviewed research of self-regulatory behavior, affective and 
emotional functioning, and attention in the context of both mindfulness and WMC is 
largely correlational in nature. Future research concerning these two cognitive processes 
should investigate further into such positive associations with affect and self-regulatory 
behavior, and focus on potential causal relationships between WMC and mindfulness.  
 Mindfulness and WMC: Compatible constructs.  As previously mentioned, 





relationships to attention, cognitive control, and emotion regulation. Multiple recent 
studies have indicated improvements in WMC following mindfulness training 
(Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Jha et al., 2010; Kozhevnikov, Louchakova, Josipovic & 
Motes, 2009; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David & Goolkasian, 2010), and this research 
has also suggested that increases in WMC may mediate the observed improvements in 
affective regulation following mindfulness training. The increases seen in WMC during 
studies of mindfulness training may themselves be mediated by increases in attentional 
areas, as was observed through mathematical modeling in a study of mindfulness training 
and working memory (van Vugt & Jha, 2011). Following a month-long mindfulness 
training retreat, participants were presented with a delayed-recognition working memory 
task using highly confusable face stimuli. Results demonstrated that MT participants 
demonstrated faster response times and improvements in information quality and 
decisional processes when compared to an age and education matched control group.  
Further investigation of the relationship between mindfulness and WMC was explored in 
several studies conducted by Stanley and Jha, which assessed WMC status pre- and post-
mindfulness training, using the Ospan task1 in a cohort of military service members (Jha 
et al., 2010; Stanley & Jha, 2009). In the 2010 study, Jha, Stanley and colleagues 
investigated the impact of mindfulness training (MT) on WMC and affective experience 
in a cohort of Marines during the pre-deployment period. It was hypothesized that the 
                                                          
1 The Ospan requires participants to solve a series of math problems while trying to remember a sequence of unrelated 
letters, ranging from three to seven letters in length. The Ospan score, which is the most commonly used index of 
WMC (see Conway et al., 2005), is the sum of all recalled letters from letter sets that were recalled completely in the 






MT would mitigate the effects of long term stress typically experienced during the pre-
deployment period by increasing WMC in the service members and decreasing negative 
affect. The cohort was divided into two groups, both of which were exclusively male 
service members. The control group contained 17 participants and the group who 
received mindfulness training contained 31 individuals who participated in an 8 week MT 
course, as well as logging MT practice hours outside of the structured course time. Of the 
31 Marines who underwent MT, two were excluded from the final analysis due to failure 
to follow participation guidelines. A third group of civilians not undergoing the 
prolonged stressor of pre-deployment was also provided the MT. In regards to results, 
WMC remained stable throughout the study in the civilian group, and it was found to 
decrease in the military control group. In the MT group, those with greater amounts of 
MT practice time demonstrated increased WMC, while participants with low practice 
times experienced similar decreases in WMC to the control group. These results are 
suggestive of a dose-response effect. Moreover, those with greater practice times were 
also found to report lower levels of negative affect, measured by the PANAS, as well as 
higher levels of positive affect. The relationship between practice time and negative, but 
not positive, affect was found to be mediated by WMC. Interestingly, previous research 
found the presence of negative affect to mediate working memory performance 
(Linnenbrink, Ryan, & Pintrich, 1999). These results indicate that sufficient amounts of 
MT practice may provide a protective effect against impairments in WMC associated 
with high-stress environments. However, the implications of this study are limited to an 





stressor on WMC.  Other studies, although not specifically examining the link between 
mindfulness and WMC, have alluded to WMC’s relationship with cognitive activities 
purported to be contained within the construct of mindfulness. For example, Barrett and 
colleagues (2004) suggested that individuals high in WMC are more skilled in controlled, 
goal-directed cognitive processing in the face of distractions. This trend appears to reflect 
the focused attention component of mindfulness frequently used in factor analyses of 
mindfulness scales (Davis, Lau, & Cairns, 2009; Feldman et al., 2007; Brown & Ryan, 
2003). Additionally, a series of studies by Schmeichel and colleagues (2008) found that 
individuals high in WMC were better able than those with low WMC to adopt an 
unemotional attitude while viewing emotionally charged stimuli. These results are 
reminiscent of the nonjudgmental awareness component of mindfulness as well as Lau 
and colleagues’ mindful construct of decentering (the ability to not personally identify 
with internal, emotional content; Lau et al., 2006). 
 Neuroimaging support. In addition to the previously mentioned empirical 
studies, which have begun to delineate commonalities between WMC and mindfulness, 
recent research utilizing neuroimaging techniques further elucidate potential common 
structural underpinnings relevant to WMC and mindfulness, such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). A multitude of neurophysiological studies of monkeys 
(Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Fuster & 
Alexander, 1971; Miller, et al., 1996; Quintana & Fuster, 1999) and more recent fMRI 
studies of humans (Courtney et al., 1998; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Zarahn et al. 1999; 





as a brain structure critical to WMC. Additionally, several human fMRI studies have also 
demonstrated that reduction in activity of the DLPFC leads to WMC performance 
reduction (Funahashi et al., 1993; Pessoa et al., 2002; Sakai et al., 2002). Although there 
are relatively few neuroimaging studies specifically examining the neural correlates of 
mindfulness, those that exist identify brain structures associated with DM and a state of 
mindfulness, particularly the DLPFC. For example, Creswell and colleagues (2007) 
reported an association between DM, as measured by the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003), 
and enhanced DLPFC and decreased amygdala response during an affect-labeling task 
presented concurrently with fMRI scanning; specifically, the task involved matching 
facial expressions to appropriate affect words. Moreover, DM was associated with 
increased overall PFC activation affect labeling, compared with a gender labeling control 
task. The authors also found activity in the PFC during affect labeling to be negatively 
associated in participants high in DM but not in low DM participants. In a similar study 
of 18 healthy individuals, Modinos, Ormel, and Aleman (2009) found that DM, as 
measured by the KIMS (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) was positively associated with 
increased DLPFC activation during instructed reappraisal of negatively valenced 
photographs, viewed while participants underwent fMRI scanning. Both Modinos and 
Creswell’s investigations utilized only one measure of DM. These studies may have 
contributed more to the understanding of brain structures related to mindfulness by 
including several measures in their assessment of DM.   
 While not assessing DM, a neuroimaging study of mindfulness practitioners 





with significant changes in brain structures (Lazar, Kerr, Wasserman, Gay, et al., 2005). 
Specifically, those participants with extensive meditation experience showed increased 
cortical thickness in Brodmann’s Area (BA) 9, an area of the brain which contributes to 
the DLPFC, in comparison to novice practitioners and non-practitioners. Interestingly, 
this increase in cortical thickness appeared to be resilient to the effects of aging, as 
experienced middle-aged practitioners displayed similar cortical thickness typically seen 
in individuals in their twenties and thirties. These results indicate time spent in a mindful 
state may activate BA 9, a region previously identified as an important cortical site for 
the voluntary regulation of negative emotion (Levesque et al., 2003) and the regulation of 
stressful input (Liberzon et al., 2007). Furthermore, analysis of these results suggests a 
structural correlate to mindfulness’ positive associations with emotion regulation (Baer et 
al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003). Indeed, due to its anatomical connections to lateral 
columns of the periaquaductal grey, a structure which encircles the mesenphalic aquaduct 
(Linnman et al., 2012) and association with active emotional coping styles (Keay & 
Bandler, 2001), BA 9 has been suggested to serve as an integrative site which regulates 
affective states and active coping behavior during times of stress. While the results of the 
Lazar (2005) study reinforce the connection between mindfulness and the DLPFC, the 
authors did not assess for DM and were primarily concerned with formal mindfulness 
practice. This may limit the generalizability of the results in regards to neural correlates 
of DM. However, they do replicate findings similar to previously mentioned 
neuroimaging studies implicating the DLPFC’s relationship with DM, in addition to its 






 While the link between stress and memory has been a topic of frequent research 
(for a review, see Lupien, Maheu, Fiocco, & Schramek, 2007), fewer studies have 
considered the effect on acute stress on specific cognitive domains, such as WMC. 
Indeed, specific focus on a particular domain of cognitive function is crucial, as stress 
may actually impart unique effects on different domains (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2009). 
Acute stress, specifically, refers to situations which involve novel problems, time 
pressure, and high levels of ambiguity, or scenarios in which survival is at risk (Salas, 
Driskell, & Hughes, 1996). Typically, the experience of acute stress results in a cascade 
of physiological responses primarily originating in the activation of two biological 
systems, the sympathetic adrenal medulla (SAM) axis and the hypothalamic pituitary 
(HPA) adrenal axis (Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011). In the event of acute 
stress, the SAM axis responds with the release of neurotransmitters including epinephrine 
and norepinephrine, which subsequently influence heart rate and blood pressure, while 
the HPA axis releases cortisol (Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011). The time 
frame of the acute stress response is important in understanding the neurobiology of acute 
stress. Previous research suggests that following a moderately acute stressor, it may take 
several minutes for heart rate to return to baseline, as well as approximately one to two 
hours for cortisol levels to return to the baseline (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 
1995). 
 Effects of acute stress on WMC. At a moderate level, an acute stressor may 





demonstrated high levels of stress can have negative effects on both physical and mental 
health (McEwen, 1998; Schneiderman, Ironson, & Siegel, 2005; Selye, 1955). As 
previously mentioned, stress has been shown to have particularly deleterious effects on 
WMC. For example, a recent study by Duncko, Johnson, Merikangas, and Grillon (2009) 
examined working memory performance during an item recognition task after randomly 
assigned subjects had been exposed to a cold pressor stress test, an acute adrenergic 
stressor which involves insertion of the subject’s dominant hand into ice water for 60 
seconds. Subjects in the control group inserted their dominant hand in room temperature 
water. Following a twenty minute delay, working memory performance was tested with 
an item recognition task. Physiological changes were assessed by measuring heart rate 
and salivary cortisol before, during, and after the stress procedure was administered. 
Through these measures, Duncko and colleagues found that stress exposure was 
associated with significantly shorter reaction times during recognition trials which 
required greater amounts of information to be processed simultaneously. Moreover, 
individuals exposed to the stressor were more likely to display higher false alarm rates 
than those in the control group. These results suggested a paradoxical effect of exposure 
to the cold pressor test, with indication of both enhanced and impaired performance on 
working memory tasks. In their discussion of these results, the authors suggested that this 
cognitive pattern might in fact be representative of a form of information processing 
utilized in threatening situations, which is more efficient in its discrimination of stimuli 
as to be beneficial in a scenario where rapid cognitive action might engender greater 





 A second study of WMC under stress employed an acute, social stressor, the Trier 
Social Stress Test2 (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993), on subjects randomly assigned to a 
stress group (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2009). Control group participants and the stress 
group, following stress induction, were then asked to perform on a task of working 
memory, and salivary cortisol levels were sampled throughout the experiment to measure 
physiological stress effects. Results of this study indicated a prominent working memory 
deficit in those subjects exposed to the stressor. As with Dunko and colleagues, Luethi, 
Meier and Sandi suggested that their observations regarding the effect of stress on 
working memory indicated an adaptive, streamlined mode of processing initiated in 
potentially threatening situations, potentially mediated by the release of cortisol. 
However, they also noted that should this type of processing be employed continually, it 
might lead to the development or maintenance of disorders such as depression or PTSD. 
This claim is supported by neurophysiological research which suggests chronic stress 
may remodel neural pathways due to sustained activation of the HPA axis (Magarinos, 
McEwen, Flugge, & Fuchs, 1996; Vyas, Mitra, Shankaranarayana Rao, & Chattarhi, 
2002). Unfortunately, Luethi and colleagues’ sample consisted solely of men, limiting 
generalization of results to both genders. The effects of acute stressors on specific brain 
regions implicated in WMC have also been investigated. A study by Qin and colleagues 
                                                          
2 The TSST is a motivated performance task which combines elements of uncontrollability and high levels of social-
evaluative threat (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The task consists of a brief preparation period (3 minutes) followed by a 
test period. During the test period, the subject must deliver a free speech (5 minutes) and perform mental arithmetic (5 
minutes) in front of an audience (for a detailed description of TSST procedures and a review of relevant research, see 






(2009) found that acute stress significantly reduced activity in the DLPFC, which is 
functionally related to working memory. Psychological stress was induced in healthy 
volunteers through presentation of movie clips containing violent content during 
simultaneous fMRI scans. During presentation, participants were asked to imagine 
themselves in the scene as an eyewitness in order to achieve maximum emotional 
involvement. While still undergoing fMRI scanning, participants completed the N-Back 
test3 (Kirchner, 1958) of WMC. As previously mentioned, study results demonstrated 
reduced activity in the DLPFC following stressor presentation and during the working 
memory task. FMRI scans also indicated a reallocation of cerebral blood flow away from 
functional regions associated with higher order processes, or executive functioning, in 
combination with less deactivation in functional areas associated with the default mode 
network (DMN). The DMN is a system of cortical structures responsible for the brain’s 
resting state, which is activated in the absence of stimulus-dependent thought and is 
associated with mind wandering (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Mason et al., 2007). 
Moreover, activation of the DMN appears to reduce processing of sensory awareness, 
thus protecting attention absorbed by internal stimuli (Barron, Riby, Greer, & 
Smallwood, 2011). In regards to these findings, results of the Qin study (2009) suggest 
that tasks involving WMC in the context of acute psychological stress may represent dual 
processing of both external and internal stimuli. Moreover, the stress-induced 
                                                          
3 The N-Back task is a frequently used measure in studies of WMC. Participants are presented with a stream of stimuli 
and are asked to decide for each stimulus whether it matches the one presented N items before (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Perrig, & Meier, 2010). Studies have shown that processing load can be varied systematically by manipulating the 






deactivation of the DLPFC, through the release of large amounts of dopamine and 
norepinephrine into the PFC (Zigmond, Finlay, & Sved, 1995) in conjunction with 
reciprocal allocation of activity to the DMN, appears to be linked to task-irrelevant 
thought intrusions. As previously mentioned, the inability to screen task-irrelevant 
cognitions has been linked to lowered levels of WMC.  
 Previous research suggests that this biological response to acute stress is 
representative of a survival mode of cognition, in which slower higher-order cognitive 
processes are deactivated in order to allocate more resources to faster, reflexive types of 
cognition (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Diamond et al., 2007), such as those related 
to “fight-or-flight” mechanisms (Cannon, 1929). Similar studies of working memory 
performance under acute stress have also indicated a change in cognitive processing 
biased towards speed. As previously mentioned, Dunkco and colleagues (2009) found 
higher false positive rates on a recognition task in individuals who had been previously 
subjected to a cold pressor stress test, while Luethi and colleagues (2009) similarly 
demonstrated a more streamlined mode of cognitive processing resulting in working 
memory deficit following an induced social stressor.  
 In addition to the cognitive costs of physiological reactions to acute stress, the 
deactivation of prefrontal brain structures in the presence of acute stress induced in 
laboratory settings, such as in the Qin study, is remarkably similar to the decreased 
activity of frontal regions symptomatic of individuals with various psychological 
dysfunctions associated with working memory deficits (Qin et al., 2009). Previous studies 





disorders such as ADHD, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic stress 
disorder, may be associated with the heightened levels of stress reported by individuals 
with these conditions (Arnsten, 2007; Arnsten & Li, 2005).  
 In summary, acute stress has been demonstrated in laboratory studies to have 
deleterious effects on WMC. However, the studies concerning acute stress and WMC 
present a wide array of methods with which acute stress is induced. While the variability 
in the type of stressor utilized presents a limitation in regard to the ability to synthesize 
the collective results, analysis of the results themselves indicate several areas of 
congruence. For example, both performance measures of WMC and functional 
measurement of brain structures implicated in WMC indicate reduced functioning 
following the presentation of an acute stressor. Additionally, collective results suggest 
that the presence of an acute stressor may create a survival mode of cognition, in which 
higher-order processes are disabled in favor of more reflexive forms of cognition. 
However, the presence of mindful awareness may reduce the loss of frontal functioning, 
as suggested in the following review of literature concerning mindfulness and acute 
stress.    
 Acute stress and mindfulness. Research concerning mindfulness and stress is 
most often focused on stress-reduction outcomes, with mindfulness introduced as an 
independent variable acting on individuals faced with chronic stress, such as chronic 
medical conditions, care-giving roles, or stressful occupations (Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, & 
Cordova, 2005; Minor, et al., 2006; Birnie, Garland, & Carlson, 2010). However, 





research participants. Though not directly assessing mindfulness, Gohm, Baumann, and 
Sniezek (2001) conducted a complementary study of affective reactions and cognitive 
performance in a sample of firemen during a live fire training exercise. The study 
examined variables such as attention and clarity, which was defined as “the extent to 
which individuals are able to distinguish and identify which specific emotion they are 
experiencing in the moment” (Gohmm, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2001, pp. 390). While not 
defined as mindfulness, this description certainly echoes mindfulness tenets such as 
present moment awareness and receptivity of inner experiences. Previous research 
demonstrated the activation of the SAM axis following an acute stressor can induce a 
prolonged negative affect state, and a subsequent loss of cognitive flexibility (Sinha, 
Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992; Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goschke, 2011). Gohm and 
colleagues hypothesized subjects with higher levels of clarity would spend less time 
attending to an emotional response to a stressful event once that emotion has been 
identified, and therefore better allocate cognitive resources to the task at hand. 
Essentially, these individuals would spend less time engaged in ruminative reactions to 
emotions evoked by the acute stressor and perform better than those who struggled with 
emotional reactions. This hypothesis was supported as firefighters who reported easily 
identifying emotions during the live fire exercise also reported fewer instances of 
cognitive difficulties. Their counterparts with low clarity of emotional experience 
reported greater incidence of cognitive failures, such as their mind going blank.  
 In a mindfulness study featuring acute stress induction, Barnes and colleagues 





emotional, cognitive, and behavioral stress responses to conflict in romantic dyads. In 
order to induce relationship stress, the experimenters utilized a technique developed by 
Gottman (Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998; Levenson & Gottman, 1983) to 
create relational conflict in couples. Specifically, couples were asked to discuss areas of 
conflict in their relationship first in person and then over an intercom, with their 
interactions both observed and recorded, and later coded for discrete examples of stress 
responses. Results suggested that individuals in the study with high scores on a measure 
of DM experienced a less severe emotional reaction during the induced relational 
stressor, as well as significantly lower levels of anxiety and anger following the period of 
conflict than those with lower levels of DM. 
 One other study featuring the induction of acute stress in concert with measures of 
mindfulness was undertaken by Weinstein, Brown, and Ryan (2009), who investigated 
the effects of DM on stress perception. Participants were first assessed for baseline levels 
of stress, anxiety, and DM; DM was assessed using the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
Following assessment, participants completed a stress induction task during which they 
were required to perform mental arithmetic under observation with performances timed 
and recorded. This stress induction task was adapted from a previously verified method 
of stress induction developed by Cheng (2003). After a thirty minute delay, participants’ 
ability to complete mazes (an activity incorporating both creative thinking and 
concentration) was assessed. Study results indicated that individuals with higher scores 
on a measure of dispositional mindfulness perceived less stress throughout the 





dispositional mindfulness scores. These individuals with high DM were also observed to 
perform with higher capabilities on the maze tasks which followed the post-stress 
induction delay.  
 A recent study of the influence of acute stress on spatial task performance 
indicates similar interference by emotional experiences as found by Weinstein and 
colleagues (2009). Richardson and Vanderkaay Tomasulo (2011) found that participants 
who were presented with an acute stressor performed with slower response times in two 
novel spatial tasks than those participants in the control group. Participants in the stressed 
group also reported a prolonged negative affect state following the stressor, including 
higher levels of anger, frustration, and irritability. The authors of the study suggested that 
heightened negative affect may have interfered with processing speed during the spatial 
tasks, indicating a reallocation of cognitive resources away from the tasks as a result of 
distressing, internal experiences.   
 To summarize, the activation of the SAM axis in response to an acute stressor has 
been implicated in the generation of a protracted experience of negative affect; it would 
appear that the associated emotional response to acute stress creates additional cognitive 
demand on an already taxed system, leading to changes in the processing of information. 
However, the perspective through which this emotional response is viewed may influence 
the degree to which it represents an additional cognitive demand, lessening the need for 







Proposed Theoretical Framework  
 A review of the literature concerning mindfulness and WMC in the context of 
acute stress suggests multiple areas of overlapping processes related to emotional 
reactivity and higher order cognitive functioning. However, due to only relatively recent 
interest in neuropsychological attributes of mindful processes, there is an obvious dearth 
of research investigating causal relationships between WMC and mindfulness in the 
context of acute stress. The following theoretical model, illustrated in Figure 1, is 
proposed as a potential process through which the complementary mechanisms of 
mindfulness and WMC may interact after the presentation of an acute stressor.  
 This conceptual model borrows its basic structure from the transactional model of 
stress originally developed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984), while also integrating the 
construct of mindfulness. Moreover, this model is novel in its approach of considering a 
mindful appraisal process within the context of acute stress and its effects on working 
memory. The transactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) was chosen as a 
format for the current model as the transactional model and mindfulness have previously 
been integrated successfully. Notably, Kabat-Zinn (1990) incorporated the transactional 
stress model with mindfulness during the development of the MBSR program.  
 The transactional model is based in Lazarus’ original cognitive stress theory, 
which assumes cognitive appraisal processes to be important mediators of the stress 
process (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Appraisal refers to the cognitive 
process by which stressful events are evaluated in reference to one's well-being (Lazarus, 





shown to mediate the stressfulness of said event, and appears to aid in the regulation of 
the quality and intensity of emotional response to the situation (Steptoe & Vogele, 1986). 
In the transactional stress model, Lazarus proposed the existence of two forms of 
appraisal. During the primary appraisal, an individual evaluates whether the situation 
presents a threat to one's well-being, while the secondary appraisal involves the 
individual’s evaluation of coping options and their effectiveness relative to the threat. 
According to the transactional model, a stress response occurs when the primary 
appraisal indicates a threat and the secondary appraisal indicates the individual’s coping 
options are inadequate in the face of this threat. The transactional model has largely been 
empirically supported in a variety of areas (Quine & Pahl, 1991; Maier et al., 2003; 
Tomaka et al., 1993), although there is limited support for the model with regards to 
cortisol levels as a marker of stress response (Gaab et al., 2005; Denson et al., 2009). 
 As previously mentioned, Kabat-Zinn’s (1990) development of the MBSR 
program represents an earlier successful integration of mindfulness and the transactional 
model. Specifically, Kabat-Zinn proposed mindfulness to be of importance during the 
appraisal stage of the transactional stress model, during which the individual determines 
whether or not a specific circumstance is indeed a stressor. At this stage, the present-
moment awareness fostered during a mindful state allows for an objective, accurate 
appraisal of the event, which allows for effective responding rather than habitual, 
physiological reactivity (Ulmer, Stetson, & Salmon, 2010). This model has subsequently 
received empirical support (Shapiro et al., 2006). However, Kabat-Zinn’s proposed 





concerned with the appraisal of stress resultant from prolonged conditions, such as 
chronic pain or chronic medical illness. As previously established, chronic stress is 
qualitatively different from acute stress, both experientially and in terms of physiological 
response. Additionally, the gap in research literature concerning how mindfulness and 
working memory interact during acute stress to preserve cognitive functioning has also 
been previously established. The proposed model is an attempt to fill this gap, and its 
components are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1.  Theoretical illustration of relationship between DM and WMC following an 
  acute stressor. 
 Primary threat appraisal.  Prior to the first appraisal stage, an event occurs in 





potential acute stressor, as its actual threat value has yet to be determined. This 
determination follows during primary stage of appraisal, as in the primary appraisal of 
Lazarus and Folkman’s model, during which the individual evaluates whether or not the 
event represents a threat to survival or well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Aspects 
which might lead to an event being interpreted as acutely stressful include novel 
problems, time pressure, and immediate threats to emotional or physical integrity (Salas, 
Driskell, & Hughes, 1996). If, at this point, the event is not judged to be an acute stressor, 
the individual then exits the acute stress appraisal process. However, should elements of 
the event be appraised as indicative of an acute stressor, a rapid cascade of physiological 
responses begins. The SAM and HPA axes respond with the release of neurotransmitters 
and stress hormones (Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011), which ready the body 
for survival. Common effects of this physiological response include increased heart rate 
and blood pressure, and accelerated breathing. These physiological reactions resulting 
from identification and appraisal of an acute stressor become additional information to be 
appraised as part of this process.   
 Secondary threat appraisal. The current model differs from the transactional 
stress model (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) in its approach to the secondary appraisal stage. 
The secondary stage of Lazarus and Folkman’s model entails an appraisal of coping 
resources; however, it is suggested that in the context of an acute, potentially life-
threatening stressor, there may not be enough time to methodically analyze resources 
available to the individual or to engage in coping methods such as seeking social support 





individuals may be more likely to appraise their own internal experience of the stressor to 
determine their ability to manage the stressor effectively. While information evaluated in 
the primary threat appraisal stage is largely environmental in nature, the secondary threat 
appraisal phase exists as an immediate evaluation of internal sensory information, such as 
the previously mentioned sequelae of the SAM and HPA activation. It is during this 
appraisal of internal sensory experiences that an individual’s level of DM is proposed to 
create a moderating effect. Individuals with a high level of DM are predicted to attend to 
internal physiological input without evaluation or judgment (Ehlers & Clark, 2011). 
Additionally, they are likely to experience low reactivity to intrusive thoughts and any 
negative affect created by HPA axis activation (Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & 
Goschke, 2011; Sinha, Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992). Moreover, results of the secondary 
threat appraisal would be akin to an objective awareness of these inner experiences, 
without application of “good” or “bad” labels, and maintained present moment focus 
(Giluk, 2009). As a result, secondary stress due to interpretations of physiological 
reactions as additional sources of threat does not occur (Shapiro et al., 2006), and 
attention may be consistently redirected towards present moment experiences rather than 
absorbed by inner experiences (Bishop et al, 2004).  
 In contrast, an individual with low levels of DM would be expected to appraise 
internal stimuli quite differently. Such individuals are predicted to react to the 
physiological sequelae of acute physiological activation without the support of a neutral, 
objective perspective. Instead, low DM individuals would produce cognitive evaluations 





(“this experience is bad”; Giluk, 2009), or interpreting such reactions, intrusive 
cognitions, or distressing affect as additional sources of fear or stress (Shapiro et al., 
2006). These experiences are appraised as negative, troubling, or indicative of an 
inability to manage the stressor effectively (Ehlers & Clark, 2011). Low levels of 
mindfulness at this stage also lead to greater attentional resources directed away from the 
present moment, and towards intrusive thoughts or other distressing internal experiences, 
or the presence of HPA-induced negative affect (Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & 
Goschke, 2011; Sinha, Lovallo, & Parsons, 1992). Following the secondary threat 
appraisal stage, individuals low in DM have twice evaluated their situation as 
threatening: external stimuli resulted in the positive appraisal of an acute stressor, while 
the secondary appraisal found internal stimuli to be additional sources of acute stress. 
Neurologically, the result of these two appraisals is reduced activity in the DLPFC 
(Creswell, et al., 2007; Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2009), and attention is absorbed by 
non-present moment, internal stimuli such as ruminations, cognitive evaluations, and 
judgments. Ultimately, the secondary appraisal stage for low DM individuals has resulted 
in the evaluation of inner experiences as additional, acute stressors in and of themselves, 
increasing to the point at which cognitive load compromises the mind’s ability to shield 
itself from irrelevant stimuli (Baddeley, 2003; Engle, 2002; Evans & Schamberg, 2009). 
 Effect on WMC and subsequent behavioral action.  Results of the secondary 
appraisal stage, moderated by the level of DM present in the individual, directly influence 
the subsequent impact on WMC. While WMC may decline to some degree in the context 





high DM individuals are able to avoid significant WMC degradation following an acute 
stressor due to an objective stance towards inner experiences during the secondary 
appraisal. Because of their ability to maintain a present moment focus, individuals with 
high DM support maintenance of relevant information by shielding it from potentially 
attention-absorbing inner stimuli, such as cognitive or physiological events (Marks, 
Sobanski, & Hine, 2010). This ability mirrors the function of WMC (Baddeley et al., 
2003; Conway et al., 2005; Engle et al., 2002), producing the experience of maintained or 
non-significantly decreased WMC following presentation of an acute stressor. It is 
predicted that for this type of individual, the behavioral action taken will be that of a 
measured response to the stressor as a result of mindfulness-enhanced self-regulation 
supporting decision making (Shapiro et al., 2006). In the case of a low DM individual 
following presentation of the same stressor, significant decrease in WMC is unavoidable. 
As previously mentioned, both primary and secondary appraisals have resulted in the 
identification of both external and internal sources of stress, attentional resources have 
been directed away from the present moment and towards internal experiences 
(Richardson & VanderKaay Tomasulo, 2011), and activity in the DLPFC, the brain 
structure critical to WMC functioning (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Jha & McCarthy, 
2000; Leung et al., 2002), has been reduced (Creswell et al., 2007; Modinos, Ormel, & 
Aleman, 2009).  It is predicted that for a low DM individual, the behavioral action which 
follows the acute stressor and both appraisal stages will be that of a reflexive reaction. As 
previously mentioned, numerous empirical studies suggest impaired WMC to be 





processes biased towards speed rather than accuracy (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; 
Diamond et al., 2007; Dunkco et al., 2009).    
 Focus of Current Study 
 Study rationale. The importance of this theoretical illustration of the potential 
moderating effect of DM upon WMC following an acute stressor lies in its implications 
for future clinical interventions for individuals likely to encounter acute stressors as an 
occupational hazard. Mindfulness exists to some degree as an innate aptitude in all 
individuals, and can be enhanced with training and maintained though practice (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Therefore, mindfulness training interventions might be 
developed for individuals such as emergency service personnel, law enforcement, and 
military service members to enhance already present levels of DM and the likelihood of 
WMC maintenance following an encounter with an acute stressor. While the previously 
described survival mode of cognition engendered through an acute stress-induced 
decrease in WMC (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Diamond et al., 2007; Duncko et 
al., 2009; Luethi et al., 2009) certainly has merit in situations requiring rapid reflexive 
action, it may also come at the cost of higher-order decision making required for acutely 
stressful circumstances with high levels of ambiguity. Such situations are frequently 
encountered by military personnel. Service members on the modern day battlefield 
contend with acutely stressful events under ambiguous circumstances (Searcey, 2005), 
which often require responses rather than reactions. For example, troops manning check 
points only have a few moments to decide if a speeding car is a civilian vehicle or a 





fired upon or allowed to approach the check point. Additionally, modern warfighters 
must exhibit a high level of situational awareness, effectively filtering distracting 
information and selectively attending to crucial input (Morelli & Burton, 2009). 
Examples of this might include scanning a crowded marketplace to discern the presence 
of combatants, or analyzing input from multiple visual monitors and grounding 
subsequent tactical recommendations on such data (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994; Morelli & 
Burton, 2009), all while subjected to acute stressors such as gunfire or explosions. In 
such situations, the heightened false-positive response rate associated with the reduction 
of WMC observed in Duncko and colleague’s (2009) laboratory translates to unintended 
civilian casualties. However, amplified levels of mindfulness during the secondary threat 
appraisal stage of such moments might reduce the risk of reflexive reactions, effectively 
supporting WMC, maintaining higher-order thought processes, and lifting the fog of war.  
 Current study. 
 This study was undertaken to test the moderating effect of DM on WMC, stress-
induced negative affect, and physiological arousal. A laboratory, emotionally charged 
stressor was utilized to induce acute stress and associated negative affect. While there are 
many other types of stress induction tasks in the extant literature, this type of stressor was 
chosen in an effort to duplicate the emotional and cognitive effects of acute stress. While 
the need to work within a laboratory setting and without causing actual psychological 
harm to participants means that laboratory stressors are not fully representative of a real 
world acute stressor, this emotionally charged paradigm was most analogous to situations 





military combat. Moreover, using this analogue of interpersonal violence or combat 
exposure allows results of the current study to have greater generalization to trauma-
exposed populations.  
 This study endeavored to take the next step in understanding the relationship 
between WMC and DM in the context of an acute stressor. As an initial study of this 
relationship within the specific context of acute stress, a non-clinical population of 
college undergraduate students served as participants in a laboratory-based stress 
induction study. Based on the reviewed literature and the previously discussed proposed 
model of DM and WMC interaction, it was hypothesized participants’ level of DM will 
be negatively associated with WMC loss following the stressor. Further, it is also 
hypothesized that level of DM will be negatively associated with amount of negative 
affect (NA) reported following the stress induction. Additionally, a contrasting pattern of 
physiological response to the acute stressor was expected. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that individuals with low DM would display greater physiological reactivity 
during stressor presentation than those with high DM.  
 Hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis 1.  It was hypothesized that working memory capacity (WMC) scores 
would decrease from pre- to  post-stressor, and would be moderated by dispositional 
mindfulness (DM). An interaction was also predicted, such that the low DM group would 
display a significant decrease in WMC while the high DM group would not display a 





 Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesized that negative affect (NA) scores would 
decrease from pre- to post-stressor, and would be moderated by dispositional mindfulness 
(DM). Specifically, it was predicted that the high DM group would not display a 
significant increase in NA and that the low DM group would display a significant 
increase in NA following presentation of the stressor. 
 Hypothesis 3.  It was hypothesized that greater physiological reactivity during 
stressor presentation, measured by heart rate (HR), would be observed in the low DM 
group than in the high DM group. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the low DM 
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CHAPTER 2 METHODS 
Participants 
 Recruitment. Study participants included undergraduates recruited through the 
psychology department subject pool. The study description is included in Appendix A. 
Undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses are eligible to sign up for various, 
university sponsored research studies, and receive course credit for their participation. 
Inclusion criteria consisted of age (18 and over), written and spoken English language 
comprehension sufficient for understanding directions and completing self-report 
questionnaires, and normal or corrected to normal vision. As the intent of the study was 
to examine the effects of dispositional mindfulness in a formal meditation-naïve 
population, exclusion criteria included ongoing formal meditation practice or prior 
enrollment in an MBSR program. In addition, participants were recruited and data was 
collected throughout the academic year, including the spring, summer, and fall semesters. 
This wide temporal window of data collection allowed sampling of students to take place 
at times of both high and low academic stress, which may have resulted from 
environmental factors (i.e. the start of a new school year or final examinations). 
Data Collection. Participants reported individually to the Biobehavioral Research 
Laboratory, where data collection was conducted by the study coordinator and/or 
research assistants. The study coordinator conducted approximately one fourth of the 
total data collection, and research assistants collected the remaining data; this ensured a 
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minimum amount of any experimenter bias which may have affected data collection and 
subsequent results. Moreover, both a male and female research assistant collected data, 
ensuring less risk of participant bias related to the gender of the administrator. To ensure 
a consistent experience across all participants, a standardized protocol was used (see 
Appendix B).   
Measures 
 To examine the proposed model of mindfulness and working memory within the 
context of an acute stressor, this study employed measures of mindfulness, working 
memory capacity, and affect. A measure of perceived, global stress was also utilized, and 
questionnaires related to traumatic stress, and phobic reactivity to blood and injury were 
employed as screening measures.  Demographic variables used in the analyses included 
age, gender and education level (year in college). Samples of all assessment measures are 
found in Appendix C. 
 Mindfulness. 
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). The MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 
2003) is a 15-item single-dimension scale of trait mindfulness. The MAAS is widely used 
as a measure of mindfulness, and has a longstanding record of reliability, validity and 
psychometric consistency across various cultures (Christopher et al., 2009; Cordon & 
Finney, 2008; Hansen, Lundh, Homman, & Wangby-Lundh, 2009; MacKillop & 
Anderson, 2007; Thompson & Waltz, 2007; Van Dam, Earleywine, & Borders, 2010; 
Zvolensky et al., 2006). It was developed to measure the frequency of open attention to 





Response options range from 1 (almost never) to 6 (almost always) on a Likert-type 
scale, and items are reverse scored with higher mean scores reflecting a greater degree of 
trait mindfulness. Sample MAAS items include “I rush through activities without being 
really attentive to them” and “I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the 
present.” The MAAS shows good internal consistency across a wide range of samples, 
with alphas ranging from .80–.87 (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Moreover, test–retest reliability 
data over a one month period suggest MAAS scores are stable, with no significant 
differences observed between first and second administration (Brown & Ryan, 2003), and 
criterion validity has been supported through consistent associations with behavioral, 
physiological, and neurological outcomes (Brown et al., 2011). 
 Philadelphia Mindfulness Questionnaire (PHLMS). The PHLMS (Cardaciotto, 
Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) is a self-report mindfulness measure assessing 
two factors:  Present-Moment Awareness (PMA) and Nonjudgmental Acceptance (NJA). 
Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1=never; 5=very often) according to the 
frequency that an experience occurred within the past week. Exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses support the two-factor structure of awareness and 
acceptance and good internal consistency was demonstrated in both clinical (Cronbach’s 
α=0.75) and nonclinical (awareness: Cronbach’s α=0.75, acceptance: .82) samples 
(Cardaciotto et al., 2008). While good convergent and divergent validity has been found 
for the PHLMS thus far (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), less validity research has been 
conducted than on such measures as the MAAS due to its more recent development. With 





secondary measure of mindfulness for the current study. This measure was included in 
order to determine the correlation with the MAAS, and to reveal whether the two-factor 
structure  provided interesting information about the levels of awareness and acceptance 
in the current sample. 
 Working memory capacity.  
 Operation Span Task (OSPAN). Working memory capacity was assessed using a 
computer-based version of the Operation Span Task (OSPAN). The OSPAN (Turner & 
Engle, 1989) was developed from the theoretical perspective of functional working 
memory, which emphasizes the capacity of  WM to store limited amounts of information 
while one is concurrently involved in a separate mental activity (Engle, 2002; Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974); for example, solving a math problem while simultaneously attempting to 
remember a list of words. The version of the OSPAN utilized in the current study 
required participants to solve math problems while simultaneously attempting to 
remember a set of words for later recall. During administration of the OSPAN 
participants view one math – word combination at a time, -- referred to as a string -- on a 
computer monitor. There are 15 trials, each trial consisting of two to five strings. The 
order of string size varies randomly, so that participants cannot predict the number of 
items from one trial to the next. On each trial, participants are asked to read the math 
problem out loud, solve the math problem mentally, respond “Yes” or “No” as to whether 
the equation is correct, and then read aloud the word. Immediately after the participant 





participant recalls the words presented and records them on the answer sheet. For 
example, a three-item set might include the following items displayed: 
IS (9/2) – 1 = 1? shirt 
IS (4*1) + 2 = 6? desk 
IS (10*2) − 4 = 15? dog 
??? 
 Each line is presented separately; the participant’s act of stating the word at the 
end of the equation is the prompt for the next math-word combination to be presented. 
The question marks are a visual cue for the participants to begin to write the words on the 
answer sheet. Ospan scores may be calculated a number of ways (Unsworth et al., 2005). 
However a total scoring method was utilized, in which the Ospan score is the sum of the 
total number of words recalled on the task. The rationale for this scoring method is that it 
would provide a greater range of scores with which to group the sample into high and low 
WMC subgroups, in comparison to the alternative, absolute method of scoring in which 
participants only receive credit for remembering all words in a strong in the correct order. 
Additionally, in order to ensure that participants are not trading off between solving the 
operations and remembering the words, an 85% accuracy criterion on the math operations 
was required for all participants. 
 During each sequence, the task of verifying math equations serves as interference 
as participants attempt to maintain the co-presented words in short-term memory. A 
higher frequency of words recalled correctly indicates greater WMC. The OSPAN has 





(Cronbach’s alpha=0.78; test–retest reliability r=0.83; Unsworth et al. 2005). 
Additionally, both the automated and non-automated OSPAN tasks have been previously 
used in recent research concerning mindfulness and WMC (Black, Semple, Pokhrel, & 
Grenard, 2011; Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010; Stanley, Schaldach, 
Kiyonaga, & Jha, 2011). Furthermore, the OSPAN includes two forms (Form A and 
Form B), which allows for repeated administration and counterbalancing.  
 Affect.  
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (PANAS).  The PANAS (Watson et al., 
1988) is one of the most widely used measures of affect. It specifically measures Positive 
and Negative Affect, which are considered broad mood factors under which various 
mood states are subsumed (Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988). Positive Affect (PA) refers to 
“the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active, and alert” (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988, p.1063). High PA would include energy and engagement, while low PA 
would be characterized by melancholy and fatigue. In contrast, high Negative Affect 
(NA) would involve aversive mood states such as “anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear, 
and nervousness” (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, p.1063), whereas low NA would involve 
being a state of calmness and tranquility. The measure consists of two 10-item self-report 
mood scales which were designed to measure these two separate dimensions The NA and 
PA scales have been shown to be highly internally consistent, uncorrelated, and stable 
over time. Moreover, high reliability has been demonstrated in validation studies, with 
Cronbach’s alphas of .89 and .85 found for positive and negative affect, respectively 





or not at all) to 5 (extremely) to what extent they felt a certain way during a specified 
period of time. In this experiment, participants were asked to rate their affect in the 
present moment, in order to detect changes in negative affect (NA) predicted to result 
from the stress manipulation. The PANAS has been used in multiple studies of acute 
stress (Aschbacher, Epel, Wolkowitz, Prather, Puterman, & Dhabhar, 2012; Ramsey, 
2014; Stoney, Niaura, Bausserman, & Matacin, 1999; van Marle, Hermans, Qin,  & 
Fernández, 2009), as well as studies of mindfulness and acute or chronic stress (Jha, 
Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010; Nyklíček, Mommersteeg, Van Beugen, 
Ramakers, & Van Boxtel, 2013). 
 Perceived Stress 
 Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The 10-item version of the PSS was used in the 
current study as a measure of globally perceived stress (Cohen, Kamarck, & 
Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Williamson, 1988).The development of the measure was 
informed by principles of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional theory of stress . 
Specifically, items on the PSS assess individuals’ sense of unpredictability and lack of 
control in their day-to-day lives.   Responses are scored on a five-point Likert scale, 
ranging from ‘never’ (0) to ‘very often’ (4).  A total perceived stress score is generated 
by summing the total of all items. According to Cohen and colleagues, higher scores on 
the PSS are indicative of higher levels of perceived stress.  A recent study of the PSS has 
found good internal reliability ranging from .78 to .91 (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012).  
The PSS has been frequently used as a measure of global stress in several other studies 





2005; Carmody, Baer, Lykins, & Olendzki, 2009; Lengacher et al., 2009; Klein & Boals, 
2001; Mann, Canny, Reser, & Rajan, 2013), including a study of the effect of 
mindfulness training on WMC by Stanley and colleagues (2011). Additionally, the PSS 
has been found to have good reliability and validity with use among college students 
(Roberti et al., 2006).   
 Blood/Injury Sensitivity.  
 Blood-Injection Symptom Scale. The BISS is 17-item scale frequently used as 
screening measure of phobic response to blood, injections, and injury (Olatunji, personal 
communication, August 26, 2012; e.g. Hermann, Schäfer, Walter, Stark, Vaitl, & 
Schienle, 2007; Olatunji, Connolly, & David, 2008; Page, 2003; Hepburn & Page, 2000). 
The scale was developed to assess symptoms of fear and fainting associated with blood-
injection-injury (BII) phobia as previous measures of this disorder did not fully address 
the complete spectrum of possible BII symptoms (Page, Bennett, Carter, Smith, & 
Woodmore, 1997). Items on the BISS consist of descriptions of various somatic 
experiences and sensations. Respondents are asked to indicate whether or not they 
occurred during the worst experience with blood or injections they can recall. The BISS 
is comprised of three subscales, including ‘Faintness’ (e.g. dizziness, nausea, fainting; 
nine items), ‘Anxiety’ (e.g. heart pounding, sweating, clammy hands; four items), and 
‘Tension’ (e.g. trembling, tense/ achy muscles; four items), with possible scores ranging 
from 0 to 17 (Page et al., 1997). Page and colleagues (1997) demonstrated in a large 
sample of individuals with BII phobia that blood related concerns typically produce 





response to images of blood within the emotional stressor was a concern for the primary 
investigator. Participants who endorsed having experienced syncope in response to seeing 
blood or endorsed multiple items within the Faintness subscale were excluded from the 
stressor portion of the study.  
 Trauma Sensitivity.   
 PTSD Checklist-Civilian Version. The PCL–C is a well-validated and frequently 
used measure designed to assess PTSD symptoms in civilian populations (e.g. Adkins, 
Weathers, McDevitt-Murphy, & Daniels, 2008; Busner, Kaplan, Greco, & Sheehan, 
2011; Read, Colder, Merrill, Ouimette, White, & Swartout, 2012).The scale consists of 
17 items that correspond to DSM–IV symptoms of PTSD (Weathers et al., 1991, 1993). 
Using a 5-point Likert-style scale, respondents indicate how much they have been 
bothered by each symptom in the past month. Possible scores range from 17 to 85, and 
higher scores on the PCL-C indicate a greater likelihood of PTSD. During initial 
validations studies, PCL–C scores demonstrated a coefficient alpha of .97, a test–retest 
reliability of .96, and convergent validity with other PTSD scales, such as the Mississippi 
Scale and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI–2) Keane PTSD (PK) 
Scale (Weathers et al., 1993). Additionally, Weathers and colleagues found good 
diagnostic sensitivity and specificity in the original validation samples of Vietnam and 
Gulf War veterans, with further validation studies performed with good results in civilian 
samples of motor-vehicle accident and sexual assault victims (Blanchard, Jones-
Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). In regard to factor structure, investigations of the 





experiencing, avoidance, hyperarousal, and numbing symptoms (Asmundson, Frombach, 
McQuaid, Pedrelli, Lenox, & Stein, 2000). However, a recent factor analysis of the PCL-
C in a non-clinical college sample found support for both a one-factor and two-factor 
model of PTSD symptoms (Conybeare, Behar, Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 2012). 
In this study, a conservative cut-point score was chosen with the intention of maximizing 
detection of possible PTSD cases in the sample. The National Center for PTSD 
(NCPTSD) suggests a higher cut-point score when estimated prevalence of PTSD is low 
to maximize detection. Based on the NCPTSD’s recommendations for settings with an 
estimated prevalence of 15% or below (e.g. general population samples), a threshold 
score of 35 was chosen (NCPTSD, 2014). 
 Stress induction. 
 International Affective Picture System. Previous studies of working memory and 
acute stress have utilized primarily physiological stressors (e.g. cold pressor test) to 
produce a stress response in participants, and this form of stress induction has been 
demonstrated to be a successful method of eliciting a stress response with consequences 
for WMC (e.g. Duncko, Johnson, Merikangas, & Grillon, 2009). However, given that the 
aim of the present study was to investigate the potential for mindfulness to mitigate the 
cognitive cost of an acute stress reaction and associated negative affect, an emotional 
stress induction technique was chosen in an effort to ensure a strong, affective reaction. 
The International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005) has been used as an 
emotional stressor in both studies involving mindfulness (Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007; 





& Britton, 2011; Taylor et al.,  2011) as well as prior studies of emotion and WMC 
(Mather, Mitchell, Raye, Novak, Greene, & Johnson, 2006; MacNamara, Ferri, & 
Hajcak, 2011; Pearson & Sawyer, 2011; Perlstein, Elbert, & Stenger, 2002). The IAPS 
consists of photographs of real people and objects selected to evoke negative, positive, or 
neutral affect, and it is one of the most frequently used forms of emotion elicitation in 
laboratory settings (Fechir et al., 2008; Lynch, Schneider, Zachary Rosenthal, & 
Cheavens, 200). This large set of images has demonstrated good stability of affective 
responses, and these responses to the slides have been exhibited across various 
populations and cultures (Hamm et al., 2003). Responses to the slides are empirically 
rated on two dimensions: valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant) and arousal 
(ranging from calm to excited). Each dimension is ranked on a 9 point scale, with 1 
representing low valence or arousal and 9 representing high valence or arousal (Lang, et 
al., 2005). Highly unpleasant images typically have a low valence rating and a high 
arousal rating, and prior fMRI research has demonstrated that viewing such pictures 
produces the same  response observed in the amygdala and prefrontal cortex during fear-
provoking situations (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006), as well as similar sympathetic 
nervous system activation (Carter, Durocher,  & Kern, 2008). Examples of such images 
in the IAPS include included mutilated bodies, physical assault scenes, and accident 
scenes. To create the effect of an emotional stressor, pictures which are both negatively 
valenced and highly arousing were presented in a blocked fashion; a blocked presentation 
refers to a method during which all pictures presented to participants have similar arousal 





pictures with similar affective valence consistently produces both emotional and 
behavioral reactions which are sustained even after exposure to the pictures has ceased 
(Azevedo et al., 2005; Mendonca-de-Souza et al., 2007; Pereira et al., 2006; Smith et al., 
2005). Additionally, research by Bradley and colleagues (2001, 2003) has shown that 
viewing pictures of mutilated human bodies evokes strong psychophysiological reactions, 
negative affect, and arousal in research participants, a finding that has been further 
corroborated by Azevedo et al. (2005). Bradley (2001) theorized that, from a survival 
perspective, visual images of same-species death and mutilation are the most threatening 
visual stimuli, and therefore produces a fight-or-flight response through activation of the 
sympathetic nervous system. In keeping with this theory and prior research by Bradley 
and others, 24 pictures containing images of mutilated bodies were selected from the 
IAPS bank. This number is consistent with previous research which utilized blocked 
presentation of negatively valenced IAPS pictures to induce negative affect and a 
physiological stress response (Azevedo et al., 2005; Pereira et al., 2006). Normative 
mean ratings of the images based on a sample of North American men (Lang et al., 1997) 
in terms of valence (nine-point scale from unpleasant to pleasant) and arousal (nine-point 
scale from calm to excited) were 1.8, and 6.5, respectively. A full description of each 
slide and individual valence and arousal means can be found in Appendix D.  
 In order to detect emotional arousal in response to the stressor, physiological 
indices of arousal were utilized. Prior research using the IAPS has demonstrated 
significant changes in resting heart rate during viewing of pictures (Lang et al., 1997). 





as well as differentiating between an orienting response and a defensive response to an 
aversive stimulus, as it will decelerate during orienting and accelerate during a defensive 
response (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). An initial deceleration in heart rate has been 
described by Lang and colleagues (1997) as participants orient to distressing IAPS 
pictures, followed by heart rate acceleration as the defensive cascade of sympathetic 
arousal is activated. Increases in both skin conductance and heart rate are frequently and 
reliably used as physiological indicators of a defensive response to those pictures in the 
system which are highly arousing and negatively valenced (Lang et al., 1997). 
Procedure  
 Prior to beginning data collection, the informed consent document was reviewed 
and signed by participants, who were given the opportunity to ask questions about the 
study prior to assenting. Following this, participants were given a self-report 
questionnaire packet containing a demographic information questionnaire, the PHLMS, 
the MAAS, and the PANAS for completion. Following completion of these 
questionnaires, baseline heart rate was determined through use of an automatic blood 
pressure and heart rate monitoring cuff; resting heart rate data were collected for the 
duration of inflation and deflation of the cuff, an average of approximately 15-20 
seconds. Heart rate was measured following completion of questionnaires to ensure that 
participants had time to acclimate to the laboratory, ambient temperature, and presence of 
the investigator, as well as recovered from previous physical activity (e.g. walking to the 
laboratory building, taking the stairs instead of the elevator, etc.). Although all steps were 





potential stress-related heart rate elevations prior to the stressor, it is possible that 
reactivity effects to the blood pressure cuff occurred in some participants. Participants 
were then seated in front of a 19 inch LCD, color widescreen computer monitor at a 
distance of approximately 48 inches. When seated facing the computer, the participants 
were also facing a blank wall, and the room in which the experiment took place contained 
minimal furniture and visual stimuli. Every effort was taking to maintain a quiet, non-
distracting environment for the participants to minimize any effect on WMC not related 
to the presentation of the stressor. Participants were then prepared for physiological 
recording of HR. Physiological recordings were made using the ProComp5 Infiniti 
biofeedback system, manufactured by thought technology, Ltd. The software used to 
store and analyze the physiological data was the Biograph Infiniti 7900, version 5.0.3. 
The inside of both forearms was first lightly abraded with a pre-moistened alcohol swab 
to ensure good contact of the electrodes. Three pre-jelled sensors were then applied to 
both inner wrists; negative and positive leads were located on the left wrist, and a ground 
lead was attached to the right wrist. Physiological data was collected over three separate 
time blocks: pre-stressor, during administration of the stressor, and post-stressor. The first 
time block contained the administration of the pre-stressor Ospan and lasted, on average, 
713.5 seconds. The second time block contained the administration of the screening 
measures and the IAPS; this block lasted on average 372.9 seconds. The third time block 
contained the administration of the post-stressor Ospan and the post-stressor PANAS, and 





 Participants were then provided the OSPAN response sheet and a writing utensil, 
and instructed to pay attention to and follow the OSPAN instructions presented on the 
computer screen. The pre-stressor OSPAN included a brief practice period, in which 
participants were instructed on the procedure for completing the task. Administrations of 
the two forms of the OSPAN were counterbalanced to account for any potential carryover 
effects. Participants assigned odd subject numbers for de-identification purposes received 
form A pre-stressor, and participants assigned even subject numbers received form B pre-
stressor. 
 Following completion of the pre-stressor OSPAN, participants remained seated at 
the computer monitor and the BISS and PCL-C were administered as screening measures. 
Screening measures were given following administration of the pre-stressor OSPAN to 
reduce the potential effect of stress created by items on the BISS and PCL-C on 
participants’ baseline WMC scores. Although participants knew from the study 
description that they would be exposed to a “brief stressor,” care was taken to neither 
describe the exact nature of the stressor, nor present participants with pre-stressor stimuli 
that might inadvertently increase stress levels and diminish WMC prior to administration 
of the baseline Ospan. The BISS and PCL-C were deemed to be potentially stress-
inducing, due to the high face validity of both measures. Participants who endorsed items 
on the BISS related to symptoms of fainting or dizziness in response to the sight of blood, 
or those whose total score exceeded a threshold of 35 on the PCL-C were excluded from 
the remainder of the study. The study coordinator and/or research assistants discussed the 





with psychoeducation related to any potential clinical diagnoses. All participants were 
provided with information about mental health resources available at the University of 
Louisville Counseling Center and the University of Louisville Psychological Services 
Center, should they wish to receive follow-up counseling or a more in-depth 
psychological evaluation. Several participants elected to discontinue further participation 
at this time, following detailed explanation of the stress induction methodology.   
 Following administration of the screening measures, the IAPS was administered. 
The first slide presented was a blank, white slide presented for 6 seconds. The purpose of 
this slide was so that the experimenter or research assistant could have the slide show 
prepared to play on the computer monitor without inadvertently exposing a participant to 
an image before the official start of the stressor. Twenty-four color photos containing 
images of human death and mutilation were then presented at a presentation rate of six 
seconds per picture, for a total of 150 seconds including the blank slide, 144 seconds of 
which were IAPS content. The presentation rate of 6 seconds per picture is the rate 
suggested by IAPS developers (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001); Bradley 
and colleagues (2001) have found this rate to produce heightened phasic indices of 
emotion during blocked presentation of unpleasant pictures. While similar affective and 
increased skin conductance responses have also been observed with briefer presentation 
of unpleasant pictures (i.e. 300–500 ms; Codispoti et al., 2001), the typical presentation 
rate was chosen to ensure adequate stimulus exposure and production of a defensive, 





 During the IAPS presentation, the experimenter and/or research assistants were 
seated approximately three feet to the right of the participant, so that they could observe 
reactions to the IAPS and prompt participants, if necessary, to look directly at the 
computer monitor during the presentation. Immediately following the last IAPS slide, 
participants were administered the post-stressor OSPAN. The post-stressor OSPAN 
included a brief reminder of basic instructions for completing the task, but did not include 
a practice period. The rationale behind excluding a practice period was to avoid any 
dissipation of acute emotional distress evoked through the stressor. 
 At the completion of the post-stressor OSPAN, participants were asked to 
complete the final self-report questionnaire, the post-stressor PANAS. Participants were 
asked to complete the PANAS based on their feelings in the present moment, just as they 
had during its previous administration at the start of data collection. They were then 
debriefed using the standardized script (see Appendix A) and thanked for their 
participation.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Demographics. An initial sample of 131 participants was recruited into the study. 
Forty-six participants were excluded from the stressor portion of the study due to scores 
higher than the predetermined PCL-C cut-off score, or evidence of a BII phobia. Thirteen 
participants chose to discontinue participation prior to exposure to the stressor. 
Additionally, five participants’ data were excluded from final analyses due to errors with 
data recording of physiological reactivity scores. Demographic data and mean scores on 
initial self-report measures for those participants who were discontinued are reported in a 
separate section. 
 The final sample consisted of sixty-seven participants. An a priori power analysis 
using G*Power 3.1.3 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) software suggested a sample 
size of 24 would be necessary to detect a medium effect size (f2=.4) with an alpha of .05 
and a power of .05 using the proposed statistical analyses. Over sampling was conducted 
to ensure adequate subsamples of low and high DM groups. As a result, the final sample 
size is nearly three times larger than the minimum suggested by results of the power 
analysis.  
 In the final sample, 61 percent of participants were female (N = 41) and 39% were 
male (N = 26). Mean age was 20.12 (SD = 2.20) and mean number of college semesters 
completed was 3.57 (SD = 3.11); 31 percent of the sample were in their first semester of 
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college (N = 21). In regards to ethnicity, 81 percent of the sample identified as White (N 
= 54), 9 percent as Black (n = 6), 5 percent as multiracial (N = 3), 3 percent as Hispanic 
(N = 2), 1 percent as Indian (N = 1), and 1 percent as Asian (N = 1). Participants were 
asked about previous exposure to mindfulness and meditation to ensure measures of 
mindfulness reflected dispositional qualities rather than skills built from formal practice. 
None had previously completed an MBSR program, and only 3% (N = 2) endorsed any 
previous experience with meditation. Upon being questioned about prior meditation 
practice, their experience proved to be very limited and unrelated to mindfulness. 
Consequently both participants’ data were included in the final analyses.  
 Measures. The following section contains a summary of results of descriptive 
statistics for both pre- and post-stressor measures used in the current study. A comparison 
of pre- and post-stressor mean scores and standard deviations are presented below in 
Table 1.  
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). The mean total score for the 
MAAS was 3.92 (SD=0.86). Cronbach’s α score, α = 0.898 is indicative of high internal 
reliability. These scores were similar to those reported in validation studies of the MAAS 
in large samples of undergraduate students (M=3.83, SD=0.70; Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
M=4.00, SD=0.85, α = 0.89; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007) as well as normative 
information for college students (N= 2277, M=3.83, SD=.70; Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
Scores on the MAAS were normally distributed, skewness = 0.08 (SE= 0.29), kurtosis = -





 As analyses related to the main study hypotheses required participants to be 
divided into groups of either high or low DM based on their MAAS scores, a median split 
was performed on MAAS total scores of the final sample to create these groups, utilizing 
the MAAS total score median of 3.80. Those categorized as high scorers (N=33) on the 
MAAS became the high DM group, and those categorized as low scorers (N=34) became 
the low DM group. There was a significant difference between the mean scores of these 
two groups, t(65) = -11.79, p <.001. On average, participants categorized through the 
median split as the high DM group received a score of 4.63 (SD=0.51), while the mean 
score for the low DM group was 3.22 (SD=0.47).   
 The MAAS and the PHLMS were found to be significantly but not strongly 
correlated, r(65) = 0.46, p <.01. As a strong correlation was not found, the PHLMS was 
not utilized in further analyses of the primary study hypotheses. Further exploration of 
the PHLMS data is contained in Appendix E. 
 Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). The PANAS may be administered 
using several different instructions related to a participant’s affective experience over 
various timespans (e.g. present moment, over the past two weeks, etc.; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). For the purposes of this study, the present moment-oriented instructions 
for the PANAS were utilized, which asked participants to rate how they felt “right now.” 
The pre-stressor Positive Affect (PA) mean was 30.22 (SD=6.4), and mean Negative 
Affect (NA) was 13.01 (SD=6.4). These scores are consistent with normative data found 
for present moment-oriented instructions during the initial development and validation of 





M=14.8, SD=5.4; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Post-stressor PA (M=14.97, 
SD=4.95) was found to be significantly lower than pre-stressor PA (M=25.09, SD=7.19), 
t(65) = 7.40, p <.01.   
 Operation Span Task (Ospan).  As previously mentioned, a total scoring method 
was utilized, with which the Ospan score results from the sum of the total number of 
words recalled on the task. All participants in the final sample passed the 85% accuracy 
criterion on the math operations, which suggests that they were attending to the math 
problems. Prior to exposure to the stressor, participant’s mean number of correct words 
recalled was 30.21 (SD=4.42). In a previous study of working memory capacity in 
undergraduate college students, similar mean scores were found (M=31.33, SE=0.69; 
Sibley & Beilock, 2007) while a slightly lower mean score was found in a large 
community sample (M=23.53, SD=7.92; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). 
Following exposure to the stressor, mean number of correct words recalled was 31.67 
(SD=4.40). A significant difference was found for male and female participants on post-
stressor Ospan scores, with males recalling, on average, three more words than female 
participants, t(65) = 2.22, p = .03 (males, M=33.16, SD=4.86; females, M=30.75, 
SD=3.88).     
 Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The mean PSS total score was 15.67 (SD=6.44). 
This is lower than normative data from a large, national sample of individuals under the 
age of 25 (M=16.78, SD=6.86; Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012), suggesting the current 
sample perceived themselves as experiencing slightly less stress than what has been 





consistently found that women typically report more perceived stress then men (Cohen & 
Janicki-Deverts, 2012). PSS scores were compared between genders in the current study 
to determine if there were any observable differences in total scores between genders.  
No significant difference was found in PSS total mean scores between male (M=16.11, 
SD = 6.33) and female participants (M=15.39, SD= 6.57), t(65) = 0.45, p = 0.66. A 
regression was used to determine if participants’ baseline level of perceived stress as 
measured by the PSS would predict pre-stressor Ospan scores. The PSS scores did not 
significantly predict pre-test Ospan scores, b = .001, t(65) = .01, p = 0.99, suggesting that 
participants’ level of perceived stress at the start of the study did not influence their pre-
stressor Ospan scores.   
 Blood-Injection Sensitivity Scale (BISS). The purpose of the BISS was to 
identify individuals who might experience such symptoms during the stressful exposure 
task. Total scores on this measure were not utilized, nor were they incorporated into 
analyses of the main study hypotheses. However, analysis of BISS total scores in the final 
sample does yield some relevant data. In the final sample, the mean score for the BISS 
was 3.70 (SD = 3.39), and Cronbach’s α is indicative of excellent internal reliability, α = 
0.83. A previous validation study of the BISS in a large, non-clinical undergraduate 
sample found that female participants endorsed more anxiety symptoms than male 
participants, necessitating separate norms (Page et al., 1997). A similar pattern was found 
in the present sample (female M=4.00, SD=3.68, male M=3.23, SD=2.87).   
 PTSD Checklist-Civilian (PCL-C). The mean score for the PCL-C in the final 





= 0.765. A validation study of the PCL-C in a large, non-clinical undergraduate sample 
found similar results to the current study (M = 29.12, SD = 12.31; Conybeare, Behar, 
Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 2012).  
Table 1 
Comparison of Pre- and Post-stressor Mean Scores, Final Sample   
 Mean S.D. 
Pre-stressor Ospan 30.21 4.42 
Post-stressor Ospan 31.67 4.40 
   
Pre-stressor PANAS NA 13.01 6.4 
Post-stressor PANAS NA 14.97 4.95 
   
Pre-stressor PANAS PA 30.22 6.4 
Post-stressor PANAS PA 25.09 7.19 
Note. Values in bold font represent significant differences 
 
Discontinued Sample Analyses. 
 Demographics. Of the initial sample of 131 participants recruited to the study, 64 
were discontinued from the full study protocol. Almost all participants excluded from the 
final sample were discontinued prior to stressor exposure due to their scores on screening 
measures. The demographics of the discontinued sample differed in multiple areas when 
compared to the demographics of the participants who completed the full study protocol. 
Of the participants who were screened out of the final sample, 72 percent were female (N 





discontinued sample had an average age of 21.55 years (SD=6.37).  Additionally, 64.1% 
of the discontinued sample identified as White (N=41), 14.1% identified as Black (N=9), 
12.5% identified as bi- or multi-racial (N=8), and the remaining participants identified as 
Hispanic (N=2), other (N=2), Asian (N=1) and Native American (N=1). The discontinued 
sample and final sample differed significantly by ethnic representation, c2(N=131) = 4.49, 
p = .034; there were more participants who identified as an ethnicity other than White 
who were discontinued from the study than who were included in the final sample. 
 Measures. Due to the large number of participants removed from the final 
sample, pre-stressor measures completed by the discontinued sample were analyzed 
separately. A summary of these analyses is presented below in Table 2.  
 MAAS. In the discontinued sample, the mean total score for the MAAS was 3.78 
(SD=0.64). These scores were similar, although slightly lower, to those found in a 
validation study of the MAAS in a large sample of undergraduate students (M=4.00, 
SD=0.85, α=0.89; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007). There was no significant difference in 
MAAS total score between the final and discontinued sample, t(129) = 1.05, p =.30. 
Moreover, there was no difference in MAAS scores due to gender, t(65) = 0.30, p =0.77, 
just as in the final sample. Additionally, MAAS scores in the discontinued sample did not 
predict pre-stressor Ospan total scores, b = -.01, t(60) = .63, p = 0.53.   
 PANAS. In the discontinued sample, the average score received for NA was 15.05 
(SD=5.92), while the mean score for PA was 28.95 (SD=7.10). While there were no 
significant differences reported between the final and discontinued samples regarding 





t(129)=-2.49, p =.014. NA scores for the discontinued participants were significantly 
higher than scores received by participants who remained in the final sample (M=13.01, 
SD=3.06). As in the final sample, PANAS scores in the discontinued sample remain 
consistent with initial normative data from the initial validation study of the measure in a 
large sample of undergraduate students (PA, M=29.7, SD=7.9; NA, M=14.8, SD=5.4; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).  
 Ospan.  A significant difference occurred between the discontinued participants 
and the final sample in regard to total number of words recalled on the pre-stressor 
Ospan, t(126) = 3.50, p =.001. On average, individuals who were retained into the final 
sample recalled three words more (M=30.20, SD=4.42) than those individuals who were 
discontinued from the study (M=27.40, SD=4.74). The discontinued sample’s mean 
score falls between average scores found in a previous working memory study of 
undergraduate students  (M=31.33, SE=0.69; Sibley & Beilock, 2007) and the mean score 
in a study utilizing a large community sample (M=23.53, SD=7.92; Unsworth et al., 
2005).  
 Due to the significant difference between the discontinued sample and final 
sample in representation of ethnic minorities, data was analyzed for any trends across 
study measures related to this demographic characteristic. The only significant difference 
which emerged between ethnic minorities and participants identifying as White occurred 
on the Ospan total score, t(126) =-4.05, p <.001. On average, participants identifying as 
ethnic minorities recalled three less words on the Ospan (M = 26.22, SD = 4.60) than 





 PSS. Average scores on the PSS were significantly higher for the discontinued 
sample (M=19.73, SD=6.23) than the final sample (M=15.67, SD=6.44), t(129) = -3.67, 
p <.001. PSS scores did not significantly predict pre-test Ospan scores, b = -.128, t(60) = 
-.988, p = 0.33.  In the discontinued sample, PSS total scores were significantly and 
positively correlated with both the PCL-C total scores r(59) = 0.39, p =.002 ,as well as 
with the NA subscale of the PANAS, r(59) = .48, p < .001. Moreover, PSS scores were 
found to be inversely correlated with MAAS total scores in the discontinued sample, 
r(62) = -0.40, p < .01. 
  BISS. As previously mentioned, total scores on the BISS were not utilized as part 
of the study; items targeting specific symptoms of BII phobia (e.g. dizziness or fainting) 
were utilized as the part of the pre-stressor screening procedure. However, analysis of 
BISS total scores in the discontinued sample did yield some interesting data. The mean 
score for the BISS in the discontinued sample was 28.61 (SD=4.22), compared to the 
final sample’s mean of 3.70 (SD=3.39).  
 PCL-C. The mean score for the PCL-C in the discontinued sample was 38.77 
(SD=8.95), significantly higher than the mean score found in the final sample, t(126) = -
9.84, p <.01. Moreover, the discontinued sample reported, on average, more symptoms of 
PTSD than did undergraduate students in a recent validation study of the PCL-C 
(M=29.12, SD=12.31; Conybeare, Behar, Solomon, Newman, & Borkovec, 2012). 
Further investigation of PCL-C data in the discontinued sample demonstrated 
associations between the PCL-C and several other measures. PCL-C scores were 





with the NA subscale of the PANAS, r(59) = 0.43, p = .001. Additionally, PCL-C scores 
in the discontinued sample were found to be inversely correlated with mean Ospan total 
scores, r(59) = -0.25, p =.05. 
Table 2 
Comparison of Final and Discontinued Sample Mean Scores 
  Mean S.D. 
MAAS Final Sample 3.92 0.86 
 Discontinued Sample 3.78 0.64 
    
PANAS NA  Final Sample 13.01 6.4 
 Discontinued Sample 15.05 5.92 
    
PANAS PA Final Sample 30.22 6.4 
 Discontinued Sample 28.95 7.10 
    
Ospan Final Sample 30.21 4.42 
 Discontinued Sample 27.40 4.74 
    
PSS Final Sample 15.67 6.44 
 Discontinued Sample 19.73 6.23 
    
BISS Final Sample 3.70 3.39 
 Discontinued Sample 28.61 4.22 






  Hypothesis 1. It was hypothesized that contrasting trends in working memory 
capacity (WMC) pre- and post-stressor scores would occur, and would be moderated by 
dispositional mindfulness (DM). It was also predicted that the low DM group will display 
a significant decrease in WMC while the high DM group would not display a significant 
decrease in WMC following the presentation of the stressor. 
 A 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to 
examine group differences in pre- and post-stressor Ospan performance. Test condition 
(i.e. pre- vs post-stressor) and DM category (i.e. high vs low) served as grouping 
variables, with Ospan total recall scores served as the dependent variable.  The main 
effect of test condition was significant, F(1, 64), = 11.49, p <.01. Contrary to what was 
predicted, mean Ospan post-stressor scores (M=31.67; SD=4.40) were higher than mean 
Ospan scores pre-stressor (M=30.21, SD=4.42). The main effect of DM category, 
F(1,64), = 0.01, p = .91, was not found to be significant. In addition, the interaction 
between Ospan score x DM category was not found to be statistically significant, F< 1.  
 Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesized that contrasting trends in negative affect (NA) 
pre- and post-stressor scores would occur, moderated by dispositional mindfulness (DM). 
It was also predicted that the high DM group would not display a significant increase in 
NA and that the low DM group would display a significant increase in NA following 
presentation of the stressor. 
PCL-C Final Sample 25.72 5.87 
 Discontinued Sample 38.77 8.95 





 To test whether group differences in pre- and post-stressor levels of NA, 
measured by the NA subscale of the PANAS, would be moderated by DM, a 2 (Test 
condition) x 2 (DM) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of NA was 
significant, F (1, 64), = 13.60., p < .01. Post-stressor PANAS negative affect scores 
(M=14.97, SD=4.95) were higher than PANAS negative affect scores pre-stressor 
(M=13.02, SD=3.06). The main effect of DM group, F (1,64), = 2.97, p =0.09, was not 
found to be statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction between NA X DM 
category, F<1, was not found to be statistically significant.  
 Hypothesis 3. It was hypothesized that greater physiological reactivity during 
stressor presentation, measured by heart rate (HR), would be observed in the low DM 
group than in the high DM group. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the low DM 
group will display higher overall HR during   the stressor presentation than the high DM 
group.  
 Although physiological data was collected from all 67 participants in the final 
sample, data from 18 participants was excluded either due to missing or corrupted data. 
Thus, the following statistical analyses were based on the data from 49 participants. Of 
these 49 participants, 59.2 percent were female (N=29) and the mean age was 20.33 years 
old (SD=2.32).  
  Heart rate data were collected during the IAPS presentation. Baseline HR had 
been previously collected following each participant’s completion of self-report measures 
at the start of the protocol, and was used as the pre-stressor measure of HR. To determine 





HR was averaged across the time period during which the participants viewed the IAPS 
images (150 seconds; M=78.75 beats per minute, SD=14.37) and then compared to 
participants’ mean baseline heart rate (M=77.24 beats per minute, SD=14.77).  
  A 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to 
examine group differences in pre- and stressor HR. Test condition (i.e. pre- vs stressor) 
and DM category (i.e. high vs low) served as grouping variables, with HR as the 
dependent variable.  The main effect of test condition was not significant, F(1, 47), = 
1.62, p =.21. Moreover, the main effect of DM category, F<1, was not significant. In 
addition, the interaction between HR x DM category was not statistically significant, 
F<1.  
 As no significant results were identified through use of the mean HR over the 
course of the IAPS, the mean HR at the end of the IAPS presentation was calculated 
(M=85 beats per minute, SD=25.37) in an effort to determine whether use of this data 
point would produce different results. A paired sample t-test demonstrated a significant 
difference between baseline HR (M=77.69, SD=14.59) and final HR data collected at the 
end of the stressor, t(47) = -2.413, p =.02, indicating that between the collection of the 
baseline HR and the end of the IAPS presentation, HR increased significantly,  an 
average of eight beats per minute. A comparison of high and low DM HR data revealed 
no significant difference t(46)=.63, p =.53.   
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION 
Primary Findings 
 It was originally predicted that working memory capacity (WMC) post-stressor 
scores would be lower than pre-stressor scores, moderated by dispositional mindfulness 
(DM). Additionally, it was predicted that participants in the low DM group would display 
a significant decrease in WMC, while high DM group members would not show a 
significant decrease in WMC following stressor. Results of the statistical analyses failed 
to support this hypothesis; moreover, the trend which emerged regarding WMC was a 
slight increase in Ospan scores following the stressor presentation. No differences were 
found between DM groups. 
 It is interesting that that compared to participants’ mean baseline HR, HR at the 
end of the stressor presentation was elevated. Within the study protocol, the post-stressor 
Ospan directly followed the stressor presentation, which means that participants entered 
into this test of WMC with slightly elevated HR (on average, 5 BPM more than baseline 
resting HR). The fact that Ospan scores were higher post-stressor than they were prior to 
the IAPS presentation, coupled with this elevation, suggests that the level of 
physiological arousal experienced on average was potentially enough to enhance 
cognitive abilities, and yet not high enough to engender the predicted decrease in 
cognitive functioning which has been observed in other studies utilizing this stressor. 
Moreover, the current study was able to demonstrate a change, although slight, in HR 
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following presentation of the IAPS. This finding is consistent with extant literature 
concerning the IAPS and its ability to produce measurable physiological arousal. The 
small amount of change which occurred is itself interesting, and potential theories and 
implications concerning the impact of the IAPS on this sample will be discussed further 
in a later section.  
 In regard to the hypothesis that changes in NA, measured by the NA subscale of 
the PANAS, would be seen from baseline to post-stressor, participants as a group  
experienced an increase in NA following exposure to the IAPS. This finding is consistent 
with previous IAPS literature documenting negatively valenced images’ ability to create 
a negative affective state in individuals. Moreover, PA scores following exposure to the 
IAPS were significantly lower than they had been at baseline, demonstrating a parallel 
process of increasing NA and decreasing PA in the current study. Although no 
differences were seen between DM groups in regard to the changes in negative or 
positive affect produced through the IAPS presentation, this study further supports the 
utility of the IAPS in creating changes in affect. Moreover, the blocked style of 
presentation used for the IAPS images in the current study is not as prominent in the 
extant literature as other presentation formats (i.e. combining negative and positively 
valenced images, or combining valenced images with neutral images). This study 
provides further documentation of significant change in both positive and negative 
affective states resulting from a blocked presentation style. 
 This was a study which made use of a widely researched and well validated 





not yet been fully formalized. As mentioned in the initial literature review, multiple 
definitions of mindfulness currently exist. Brown and Ryan (2003), developers of the 
MAAS, define dispositional mindfulness as a spectrum of conscious experience along 
which individual differences lie, with consistent mindful attention at the high end of the 
spectrum and habitual, automatic thinking, at the low end.  The MAAS, therefore, 
provides information related to the trait-like frequency with which an individual has 
access to a mindful state of attention and present-moment awareness. Analysis of the 
MAAS yielded several findings of importance related to both the measure and the 
concept of DM. First, the average level of DM found in the current study through the 
MAAS was a replication of previous findings in validation studies of the measure as well 
as its normative data (Brown & Ryan, 2003; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007). Secondly, 
DM as defined by Brown and Ryan (2003) was found to be normally distributed across 
the sample, with scores on the MAAS ranging at the low end of DM at 2.07 to the high 
end at 5.80. Scores on the MAAS range from one to six, suggesting that this sample may 
have a slightly restricted range. However, the results do display variance in reported DM 
in a sample of mindfulness-naïve, undergraduate students. As a result, this study further 
demonstrated the ability of the MAAS to measure mindfulness on a dispositional level in 
undergraduate college students. 
  Additionally, it is important to note the structure of the MAAS allowed the 
current study to compare individuals along the previously mentioned spectrum of 
mindfulness. The MAAS is written so that during scoring of the measure item scores are 





doing) in order to determine an individual’s level of mindful attention and awareness. 
Strong endorsement of the items as they are written would indicate an individual with 
tendencies toward “mindlessness”, or someone with very little capacity for present 
moment attention and awareness. Specifically, Brown and Ryan (2003) define 
mindlessness as “the relative absence of mindfulness” or an individual who does not 
“acknowledge or attend to a thought, emotion, motive, or object of perception” (p.823). 
The fact that the MAAS is able to assess both mindfulness and mindlessness was a 
strength within the present study’s design. The initial theoretical framework which 
influenced the study’s development and hypotheses proposed a differing process of 
events for individuals high in mindfulness versus those high in mindlessness. Use of the 
MAAS allowed for measurement of both mindfulness and mindlessness. Within the study 
design, individuals who were identified through the median split of the MAAS as part of 
the low DM group did tend to endorse more qualities of “mindlessness”, in comparison to 
the high DM group who tended to endorse more qualities of mindfulness. Thus, both 
poles of the spectrum of mindful ability were represented in the subsequent analyses, and 
in keeping with the theoretical framework of the study.  
 The current study examined only dispositional mindfulness, as opposed to 
mindfulness associated with formal training. Indeed, care was taken to ensure 
measurement of dispositional mindfulness rather than the effects of formal training by 
utilizing a mindfulness-naïve sample and using formal mindfulness training or intentional 
mindfulness practice as exclusion criteria. Future studies should compare groups of 





reporting high levels of mindfulness following formal mindfulness training. As the 
concept of dispositional mindfulness is still evolving in regard to conceptualization and 
measurement, such studies may shed light on differences in cognitive abilities and 
functioning between those with formal mindfulness training and those identified as 
simply having naturally occurring mindful traits and qualities.      
 One concern during creation of the current study’s design was related to 
participants’ baseline level of perceived stress upon entering the study. Because stress 
levels affect WMC performance, it was thought that undergraduate students participating 
in the current study under a large amount of perceived stress might display less variation 
in their Ospan scores from pre- to post-stressor. Additionally, it was considered that 
environmental stressors (e.g. midterm or final exams) might  create within-group cohorts 
of individuals with lower pre-stressor Ospan scores when compared to students who 
participated during less stressful academic periods. Due to this concern, the PSS had been 
added to the study protocol as a measure of perceived stress. Fortunately, concerns 
regarding the impact of perceived stress on pre-stressor Ospan scores were unfounded, as 
analysis of the PSS and baseline Ospan suggested participants’ level of perceived stress 
did not predict their pre-stressor Ospan scores. Furthermore, these findings demonstrate 
the efficacy of the current study in measuring WMC before and after a discrete emotional 
stressor, without intrusion of globally perceived stress potentially complicating study 








 Additionally, although not directly related to the main study hypotheses, several 
interesting observations were made through careful analysis of the demographic 
characteristics of the current study’s sample. First, the screening procedure resulted in a 
sample of participants containing more female participants and more participants 
identifying as ethnic minorities than the sample retained through the entire study 
protocol. Not only is this finding interesting, but it does have implications for the 
generalizability of the study results, as well as implications for future studies which may 
utilize similar protocols. As previously mentioned, women more frequently endorse 
symptoms of anxiety and are more frequently diagnosed with anxiety disorders than men 
(Egloff & Schmukle, 2004; McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2012). Moreover, a recent study of PTSD risk and prevalence across ethnic groups using 
a large, national sample found increased prevalence rate and higher number of reported 
symptoms for African Americans when compared to non-Hispanic whites and as well as 
other ethnic minority groups (Roberts, Gilman, Breslau, Breslau, & Koenen, 2011); the 
majority of those identifying as an ethnic minority within the current study specifically 
identified as African American. The findings of the current study pertaining to these 
demographic differences resulting from the screening process may be useful to future 
studies utilizing a similar procedure. Using different cut-points for screening measures 
based on gender or ethnic status might allow for inclusion of certain participant groups 





 A second finding of interest was that participants in the discontinued sample 
reported significantly higher levels of both perceived stress and negative affect than did 
their peers who continued through the study protocol. The results indicate the efficacy of 
the PCL-C and the BISS in identifying individuals experiencing higher levels of stress, 
and who are more likely to be experiencing a negative affective state than their 
counterparts in the final study. Future research on measures of specific anxiety disorders, 
such as PTSD or BII phobia, may wish to focus on identifying cut-points related to 
general levels of anxious distress versus those cut-points with good clinical utility in 
identifying individuals likely to meet full diagnostic criteria.  
Limitations 
 Stressor. There are several reasons why Ospan scores may have increased from 
pre-stressor to post-stressor. As previously mentioned, it is possible that the stress level 
induced via the IAPS was not high enough to engender the predicted decrease in 
cognitive functioning which has been observed in other studies utilizing this stressor. 
Over the past several decades, the level of violence and physical injury portrayed in 
popular media has significantly increased, to include television programming, cinema, 
and video games. It is possible that this study’s sample of undergraduate students may 
have been desensitized to images of death and injury to an extent that viewing static 
IAPS images did not cause a full-scale activation of the sympathetic nervous system. 
Supporting this theory is the physiological data collected during the study in the form of 
HR; only a very slight increase was seen between baseline HR and final HR collected at 





Additionally, neurocognitive literature suggests that moderate levels of acute stress result 
in improved cognitive functioning (Hidalgo et al., 2011; Lewis, Nikolova, Chang, & 
Weekes, 2008; Mohan, Sharma, & Bijlani, 2011; Weerda, Muehlhan, Wolf, & Thiel, 
2010), which would provide an explanation for the slight increase observed in post-
stressor Ospan scores.  
 To control for potential cultural habituation toward images of death and injury, 
additional screening questions could have been utilized to identify those participants who 
frequently view media with high levels of violence and imagery of human death and 
injury. If the cultural habituation hypothesis is correct, the static nature of the IAPS 
images may also have been less stress-inducing than a video clip. Other laboratory stress 
induction studies have utilized brief clips from violent movies to induce stress and 
negative affect with good success (del Palacio-González & Clark, 2013; Cousijn et al., 
2010; Henckens, Hermans, Pu, Joëls, & Fernández, 2009; Ossewaarde et al., 2010 ; van 
Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 2009). Use of such stressful, negative affect inducing 
clips for commercially available films may have been a more appropriate stressor for the 
sample utilized in the current study.  
 If the IAPS did not engender a stress response strong enough to activate the 
sympathetic nervous system, it is possible that the level of NA produced was similarly 
not high enough to be differentiated between the two DM groups. In other words, the 
current study’s stressor may have only produced moderate levels of NA across both DM 
groups, whereas a more salient stressor might have produced levels of NA high enough to 





stressor MAAS scores significantly and negatively predicted NA scores. This finding is 
in line with current mindfulness research that individuals reporting higher levels of 
mindfulness simultaneously report lower levels of negative affect (Chambers, Lo, & 
Allen, 2008; Jha et al., 2010; Schutte & Malouff, 2011; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011). 
Following the stressor, MAAS scores are no longer predictive of NA. Instead, MAAS 
scores significantly predicted post-stressor PA scores, which are again in line with 
current mindfulness research findings that individuals with higher levels of mindfulness 
report higher levels of positive affect. Thus, while NA scores were elevated post-stressor, 
appears that this increase may have been to a comparable degree for both high and low 
DM individuals.  
 Future studies utilizing the IAPS as an emotional stressor may also wish to utilize 
a sample with a broader age range to reduce potential of a cohort effect, or compare 
reported level of stress across varying age groups. The college sample utilized in the 
current study is a limitation itself, both in the previously discussed manner of a potential 
age related cohort effect, as well as in the difficulty in generalizing to broader 
populations. Use of a community sample in conjunction with the less restrictive screening 
approach may have resulted in a different outcome in regard to the impact of the stressor.   
 Screening procedure. Another possible explanation for this study’s failure to 
support the initial hypotheses related to WMC and DM may lie in the screening 
procedures utilized as part of the protocol.  Due to the graphic nature of the IAPS images 
chosen to serve as an emotional stressor, an extremely conservative screening approach 





ensure any participants who might have a strong, negative reaction to the images were 
not exposed to the stressor. Clinical concerns included participants who might meet 
criteria for Blood-injection-injury phobia (BII) or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
BII phobia is relatively common, with a lifetime prevalence of 3.5% (Bienvenu & Eaton, 
1998). Moreover, a symptom unique to BII phobia is a strong vasovagal response (e.g., 
fainting; Barlow, 2002; Mednick & Claar, 2012); as the majority of the IAPS images 
contained blood, the possibility of a vasovagal reaction in participants with undetected 
BII phobia was a concern.  
 In regards to PTSD as a clinical concern, a recent study of a large, nonclinical 
college sample found 67% had been exposed to a traumatic stressor at some point in their 
life, with 4.3% meeting full criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD (Elhai, Miller, Ford, Biehn, 
Palmieri, & Frueh, 2012). A similar study found 66% of a large, undergraduate sample 
reported exposure to a traumatic stressor, and 9% met full diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
(Read, Ouimette, White, Colder, & Farrow, 2011). In addition, the university recruitment 
site is located in an urban environment with a diverse student body, many of whom are 
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and are first generation college students. Lower 
socioeconomic status has been found to be a significant risk factor for increased risk of 
PTSD development in young people (DiGangi, Gomez, Mendoza, Jason, Keys & 
Koenen, 2013; Enlow, Blood, & Egeland, 2013; Milan, Zona, Acker, & Turcios-Cotto, 
2013).  
 Thus, while it was felt that a stringently conservative approach to pre-stressor 





been the exclusion of individuals who would have found the IAPS images stressful 
enough to induce the reduction in WMC performance. Those participants who were 
exposed to the stressor, and whose data were included in the analyses may represent a 
resilient subsample, with underlying protective traits or factors minimizing the impact of 
the stressor. Supporting this hypothesis are the higher PSS scores were seen in the 
discontinued sample when compared to the final sample. Previous research has found 
measures of resiliency to be inversely associated with the PSS (Connor & Davidson, 
2003; Vaishnavi, Connor, & Davidson, 2007; Sood, Prasad, Schroeder, & Varkey, 2011).  
 In retrospect, solutions to the screening issue could have included raising the 
PCL-C cut-point to a less conservative score, use of a PTSD measure with higher 
specificity, or use of a structured diagnostic interview to exclude only individuals 
meeting diagnostic criteria for PTSD or BII phobia. Stress induction studies utilizing an 
emotional stressor must take a dialectical approach between protecting participants from 
unnecessary psychological harm and inducing enough psychological distress to study the 
emotional and physical sequelae of this process. Erring too far in either direction of this 
research dialectic may result in negative consequences for the entirety of the study, 
whether it involve triggering a potentially significant, negative psychological reaction in 
a participant or losing access to potentially significant data; it is likely that the current 
study’s protocol resulted in the latter case.   
Conclusion 
 The purpose of the current study was to investigate the potential role of 





degradation in the context of an acutely stressful event. The study’s design and initial 
hypotheses were grounded in a conceptual model of mindfulness and WMC in the 
context of acute stress presented previously in this manuscript. Based on this conceptual 
framework, DM was proposed to act as a buffer against WMC loss, due to a tendency by 
mindful individuals to exhibit less emotional reactivity and experience less cognitive 
intrusions when they are under stress. In the current study, presentation of an acute, 
emotional stressor did engender heightened NA, as well as some physiological changes. 
These findings support the basic structure of the conceptual model, and are consistent 
with other research findings resulting from a similar stressor. In contradiction of the 
conceptual model’s proposal that WMC would either decline or be maintained due to 
variations in levels of dispositional mindfulness, scores on a WMC measure actually 
showed a slight increase following the presentation of an acute stressor.  
 Due to the support of the conceptual model through extant literature regarding 
WMC loss following acutely stressful events, it is likely that the current study did not 
utilize an adequate stress induction task. Failing to engender the necessary stress response 
likely caused the deviations from the conceptual model seen in the findings of the current 
study. Moreover, the conceptual model places emphasis on a two-step appraisal process 
which is theorized to occur directly following the acute stressor and immediately prior to 
proposed mediation of cognitive abilities by mindful traits. During the appraisal process, 
the individual first appraises whether or not the external event merits categorization as an 
acute stressor, defined as an immediate threat to emotional or physical integrity (Salas, 





the individual appraises his or her own internal experience of the stressor to determine 
whether it can be managed effectively. During application of a laboratory stressor, it is 
difficult to approximate any form of threat toward emotional or physical integrity. 
Additionally, participants entered into the laboratory setting with the knowledge that they 
were free to end their participation and withdraw from the study at any time. This ability 
to escape a potential threat is often unavailable to individuals experiencing a “real world” 
stressor, necessitating the secondary appraisal of their own experience to determine their 
capability for management of the stressor. These aspects of the conceptual model and the 
realities of laboratory-based stress induction also likely contributed with the difficulty in 
creating the necessary stress response.  
 Major implications for the current study include a more adequate stress induction 
task as well as a less stringent screening process. It is proposed that with these two 
significant alterations to the current study’s protocol, results may have been more closely 
aligned to the original conceptual framework around which the study was designed. 
Regardless of these shortcomings, the current study did generate a host of intriguing data 
related to the constructs of mindfulness and working memory in the context of acute 
stress. Research involving acute stress and potential mediators of the affective, cognitive 
and behavioral aftereffects of acutely stressful events is not only intriguing, but also 
necessary.  Outside of the laboratory setting, acutely stressful events can range from 
public speaking to a motor vehicle accident to a physical assault. Moreover, the ending of 
the United States’ involvement in Middle Eastern military conflicts has created a large 





stressful, combat-related events. Despite the fact that the current study’s initial 
hypotheses were demonstrated to be unfounded, it is hoped that the findings of this study 
are able to contribute to furthering the understanding of the human experience in the 
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Description of Study on SONA Website 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by Paul Salmon, PhD, 
principal investigator, and Lauren Vines, M.S., project director. The study is sponsored 
by the University of Louisville, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences and will 
take place at the Biobehavioral Research Laboratory, located in Rm. 320, Lutz Hall.  
 
The purpose of this study is to learn about the relationships between mindfulness (the 
ability to be non-judgmental and present-moment focused), a specific type of short-term 
memory, and stress. Participating in the study will require only one visit and take 
approximately 1 hour. Participants will be asked to complete several questionnaires and 
as well as tasks on a computer.  
 
Eligibility requirements: University of Louisville undergraduate students who do not 
have a formal meditation practice, and who have never participated in a Mindfulness-





Appendix B  
Research Protocol and Script 
Note: When running participants, the experimenters should act in a neutral emotional 
state (not overly friendly or overly cold) to minimize any effect of their demeanor on 
the affect of participants prior to the emotional stressor. 
When participant arrives 
Are you here for an experiment? What is your name?  
Do you have a cell phone with you? If yes, please turn it off or on silent– not on 
vibrate.  
You can have a seat right here. Participant is seated at computer table. 
Consent Form & Introduction 
First I have a form that tells you a little bit about the study. [Hand to them] Let 
me know if you have any questions. Participant signs two copies of consent form 
(one copy is given to them). Any questions asked by the participant are answered as 
thoroughly as possible.  
The purpose of this study is to examine how types of people perform certain 
tasks after experiencing stress. We really appreciate it if you give your full 
attention and effort to the tasks you are asked to perform during the experiment. 
First we will be collecting some information about you, using these 
questionnaires. Please take as long as you need to complete them. Give participant 





 Now we will be taking your blood pressure and heart rate using this blood pressure 
cuff, just like at the doctor’s office. We will be taking your heart rate again later in 
the experiment and will compare it to your resting heart rate now. Using blood 
pressure cuff, take blood pressure and resting heart rate. If participant asks what their 
blood pressure or resting heart rate is, tell them.  Remove blood pressure cuff.  Now I 
will attach these sensors to your forearm and finger tips so we can measure your 
heart rate and skin conductance throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
Before I do so, could you please take this alcohol wipe and vigorously rub the inside 
of your forearms with it. This will help us get a better reading from the sensors. 
Hand pre-moistened alcohol wipe to participant. If necessary prompt them to scrub 
vigorously. Attach skin conductance and EKG electrodes. Check physio program to make 
sure you are receiving data from the electrodes. Move to alternate locations if necessary. 
 Next you will be performing several computer tasks, and there will be instructions 
on the screen walking you through these. First you will be given an opportunity to 
practice the task. Again, please make sure to give it your full attention and effort. If 
you have any questions, or if the computer tells you to get the experimenter, I will be 
right here. Begin physio recording. Begin Ospan program. Answer questions as needed. 
Pre-stressor Ospan 
When the participant finishes the practice period, say, Go ahead and read through 
these instructions, and just let me know if you have any questions. Press ENTER to 





recording and save. Begin second block of physio recording and place screeners in front 
of participant. 
Screener 
I have a few more questionnaires that I would like for you to complete. Administer 
PCL-C and BISS. Answer questions as necessary. 
 If they do not pass the screeners: Based on how you answered these questions, I 
believe that you will have a very intense reaction to viewing the pictures shown 
during the study. Thank you for your interest in participating; at this time we 
will have to discontinue the study. If any of the symptoms you reported have 
been causing you difficulties, I’d like to give you some information about 
resources here at UofL that might be helpful to you. You may now break with the 
formal script and use a warm interpersonal manner. Describe the UofL PSC as well as 
counseling center. You may provide brief psychoeducation on BII phobia and/or 
PTSD as warranted. . 
 If they pass screeners: Thank you. We can continue with the experiment.  
IAPS Slides 
Next I will be showing you the pictures we talked about earlier. Please try to look at 
them for the full amount of time they are on the screen, even if you feel like closing 





If participant asks what they should do while looking at the pictures, say “Just try to 
look at the pictures for the full amount of time they are shown.” 
When IAPS slide show ends, end second block of physio recording and save data. 
Begin new block of physio data recording. Begin the post-stressor OSPAN. 
Post-stressor OSPAN (alternate form) 
The IAPS slides are being used as an emotional stressor, and have reliably produced 
negative affect in previous studies. It is important to continue using a neutral tone with 
the participant at this time, regardless of any observable change in affect. The one 
exception would be if a participant requests to discontinue during presentation of the 
slide show.   
Next you will perform several computer tasks similar to those you completed before; 
the instructions are the same however there will not be a practice period. Please 
begin.  
Post-stressor PANAS   
Administer PANAS immediately following completion of the post-stressor OSPAN.  
Please complete this final questionnaire based on how you feel at the current 






When the participant completes the post-stressor PANAS, hand them the debriefing 
sheet: Here’s a sheet telling you what this study is about. We were looking at how 
the ability to be in the present moment and accepting of certain feelings impact how 
people perform on certain tasks after they have been exposed to something that is 
emotionally stressful. Some people have a strong ability to be present-moment 
focused and accepting of difficult emotions as part of their personality, something 
we call mindfulness, and some people less so. However, we can teach people to be 
more mindful through exercises such as meditation. If being mindful can help 
people perform certain tasks better after an emotional stressor, it may be important 
to give this type of training to people who may face emotional stressors frequently as 
part of their job, such as soldiers, law enforcement, and emergency personnel. Do 
you have any questions? Thank you so much for participating in this study.  
Answer any questions the participant may have. Now that the study is complete it is no 





















Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) 
Day-to-Day Experiences 
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using 
the 1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have 
each experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather 
than what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from 
every other item. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Almost Always Very frequently Somewhat Frequently Somewhat Infrequently Very Infrequently Almost Never 
1) I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until 
sometime later.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2) I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or 
thinking of something else. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3) I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4) I tend to walk quickly to get where I'm going without paying attention 
to what I experience along the way. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5) I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they 
really grab my attention. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6) I forget a person's name almost as soon as I've been told it for the first 
time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7) It seems I am "running on automatic," without much awareness of 
what I'm doing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8) I rush through activities without being really attentive to them 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9) I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with 
what I'm doing right now to get there. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 











































11) I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else 
at the same time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12) I drive places on "automatic pilot" and then wonder why I went there. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
13) I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14) I find myself doing things without paying attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6 






Instructions:  Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Circle the number that 
best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
1. I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind. 
              1          2          3          4          5 
2. I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
3. When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions. 
               1          2          3          4          5 
4. There are aspects of myself I don’t want to think about. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
5. When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body. 
               1          2          3          4          5 
6. I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings from coming to mind. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
7. When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body. 
               1          2          3          4          5 
8. I wish I could control my emotions more easily. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
9. When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face. 
              1          2          3          4          5 
10. I tell myself that I shouldn’t have certain thoughts. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
11. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily. 
               1          2          3          4          5 
12. There are things I try not to think about. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
13. I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes. 
               1          2          3          4          5 
14. I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel sad. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
15. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting tense. 





16. If there is something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get it out of my mind. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
17. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately. 
              1          2          3          4          5 
18. I try to put my problems out of my mind. 
       1          2          3          4          5 
19. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing. 
              1          2          3          4          5 
20. When I have a bad memory, I try to distract myself to make it go away. 







































This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Slightly 
or 
Not at All 
A Little 
 
Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
 
_________ 1. Interested    _________ 11. Irritable 
_________ 2. Distressed    _________ 12. Alert 
_________ 3. Excited     _________ 13. Ashamed 
_________ 4. Upset     _________ 14. Inspired 
_________ 5. Strong     _________ 15. Nervous 
_________ 6. Guilty     _________ 16. Determined 
_________ 7. Scared     _________ 17. Attentive 
_________ 8. Hostile     _________ 18. Jittery 
_________ 9. Enthusiastic    _________ 19. Active 
_________ 10. Proud      _________ 20. Afraid 
 
Copyright © 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. 
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Perceived Stress Scale 
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last 
month. In each case, you will be asked to indicate by circling how often you felt or 
thought a certain way. 
 
Age ________ Gender (Circle): M F Other  




1. In the last month, how often have you been upset 
because of something that happened unexpectedly?..................................... 0 1 2 3 4 
 
2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable 
to control the important things in your life?...................................................... 0 1 2 3 4 
 
3. In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and “stressed”? .............. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
4. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability 
to handle your personal problems?................................................................. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that things 
were going your way?...................................................................................... 0 1 2 3 4 
 
6. In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope 
with all the things that you had to do? ............................................................. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. In the last month, how often have you been able 
to control irritations in your life?....................................................................... 0 1 2 3 4 
 
8. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things?..... 0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. In the last month, how often have you been angered 
because of things that were outside of your control? ..................................... 0 1 2 3 4 
 
10. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties 
were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?............................ 0 1 2 3 4 
 
The PSS Scale is reprinted with permission of the American Sociological Association, from Cohen, S., Kamarck, T., and 
Mermelstein, R. (1983). A global measure of perceived stress. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 24, 386-396. 
Cohen, S. and Williamson, G. Perceived Stress in a Probability Sample of the United States. Spacapan, S. and Oskamp, S. 








The Blood-Injection Symptom Scale 
These questions ask about sensations that you may experience in situations involving blood or 
injections. For each sensation, circle 'yes' if you noticed the sensation during one of your worst 
experiences involving blood or injections and circle 'no' if you did not notice the sensation during 
one of your worst experiences involving blood or injections. 
1. Did you have tightness, pain or discomfort in 
your chest? 
No/Yes 
2. Were you anxious? No/Yes 
3. Did you have blurred vision? No/Yes 
4. Did you have cold or clammy hands? No/Yes 
5. Were you dizzy or lightheaded? No/Yes 
6. Did you feel faint? No/Yes 
7. Were you fatigued? No/Yes 
8. Did you faint? No/Yes 
9. Did you feel unreal? No/Yes 
10. Did your heart pound? No/Yes 
11. Were you particularly irritable? No/Yes 
12. Did you feel nauseous? No/Yes 
13. Did the room spin? No/Yes 
14. Did you sweat? No/Yes 
15. Did your muscles feel tense, sore, or ache? No/Yes 
16. Did you tremble? No/Yes 












Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in response to 
stressful life 
experiences. Please read each one carefully, put an “X” in the box to indicate how much 
you have been bothered by that problem in the last month. 













1. Repeated, disturbing memories, 
thoughts, or images of a stressful 
experience from the past? 
     
2. Repeated, disturbing dreams of a 
stressful experience from the past? 
     
3. Suddenly acting or feeling as if a 
stressful experience were 
happening again (as if you were 
reliving it)? 
     
4. Feeling very upset when 
something reminded you of a 
stressful experience from the past? 
     
5. Having physical reactions (e.g., 
heart pounding, trouble breathing, 
or sweating) when something 
reminded you of a stressful 
experience from the past? 
     
6. Avoid thinking about or talking 
about a stressful experience from 
the past or avoid having feelings 
related to it? 
     
7. Avoid activities or situations 
because they remind you of a 
stressful experience from the past? 








Trouble remembering important 
parts of a stressful experience 
from the past? 
     
9. Loss of interest in things that you 
used to enjoy? 
     
10. Feeling distant or cut off from 
other people? 
     
11. Feeling emotionally numb or being 
unable to have loving feelings for 
those close to you? 
     
12. Feeling as if your future will 
somehow be cut short? 
     
13. Trouble falling or staying asleep?      
14. Feeling irritable or having angry 
outbursts? 
     
15. Having difficulty concentrating?      
16. Being “super alert” or watchful 
on guard? 
     
17. Feeling jumpy or easily startled?      
 
This is a Government document in the public domain. 
Weathers, F., Litz, B., Herman, D., Huska, J., & Keane, T. (October 1993). The PTSD Checklist (PCL): 
Reliability, Validity, and Diagnostic Utility. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International 














IAPS Slide Information: Slide Numbers, Descriptions and Normative Sample Valence 
and Arousal Means 
 
Slide No. Picture Description Valence Mean (SD) Arousal Mean (SD) 
3000 Mutilation 1.59(1.35) 7.34(2.27) 
3010 Mutilation 1.79(1.28) 7.26(1.86) 
3030 Mutilation 1.91(1.56) 6.76(2.10) 
3051 Mutilation 2.30(1.86) 5.62(2.45) 
3053 Burn Victim 1.31(0.97) 6.91(2.57) 
3060 Mutilation 1.79(1.56) 7.12(2.09) 
3061 Mutilation 2.32(1.61) 5.28(2.60) 
3062 Mutilation 1.87(1.31) 5.78(2.57) 
3063 Mutilation 1.49(0.96) 6.35(2.60) 
3064 Mutilation 1.45(0.97) 6.41(2.62) 
3068 Mutilation 1.80(1.56) 6.77(2.49) 
3069 Mutilation 1.70(1.41) 7.03(2.41) 
3080 Mutilation 1.48(0.95) 7.22(1.97) 
3100 Burn Victim 1.60(1.07) 6.49(2.23) 
3102 Burn Victim 1.40(1.14) 6.58(2.69) 
3110 Burn Victim 1.79(1.30) 6.70(2.16) 
3120 Dead Body 1.56(1.09) 6.84(2.36) 
3130 Mutilation 1.58(1.24) 6.97(2.07) 
3140 Dead Body 1.83(1.17) 6.36(1.97) 
3150 Mutilation 2.26(1.57) 6.55(2.20) 
3168 Mutilation 1.56(1.06) 6.00(2.46) 
3225 Mutilation 1.82(1.22) 5.95(2.46) 
9252 Dead Body 1.98(1.59) 6.64(2.33) 
9253 Mutilation 2.00(1.19) 5.53(2.40) 
 
The information presented above is taken from the IAPS instruction manual by Lang, 
Bradley, and Cuthbert (2005). Normative ratings on the IAPS were collected over a 







Further Exploration of PHLMS Data 
 The PHLMS (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) is a self-
report mindfulness measure assessing two factors:  Present-Moment Awareness (PMA) 
and Nonjudgmental Acceptance (NA). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (0=never; 
4=very often) according to the frequency that the item was experienced within the past 
week. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses support the two-factor structure of 
awareness and acceptance and good internal consistency was demonstrated in both 
clinical (Cronbach’s α=0.75) and nonclinical (awareness: Cronbach’s α=0.75, 
acceptance: .82) samples (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). While good convergent and divergent 
validity has been found for the PHLMS thus far (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), less validity 
research has been conducted than on such measures as the MAAS due to its more recent 
development.  
 With less validity research in comparison to the MAAS, the PHLMS was chosen 
as a secondary measure of mindfulness for the current study. The rationale for its 
inclusion was that if the PHLMS was found to be highly correlated with the MAAS, its 
two-factor structure might provide interesting information about the levels of awareness 
and acceptance in the current sample. In the final sample, the MAAS and the PHLMS 
were found to be significantly but not strongly correlated, r (65) = 0.46, p <.01. As a 
strong correlation was not found, the PHLMS was not utilized in further analyses of the 
primary study hypotheses. The following analyses represent a further exploration of the 





 The mean PHLMS total score for the final sample was 36.52 (SD=5.10). As 
previously mentioned, a benefit of the PHLMS is that it assesses two factors related to 
mindfulness:  Present-Moment Awareness (PMA) and Nonjudgmental Acceptance 
(NJA). Participants in the final sample scored an average of 36.52 points on the PMA 
subscale (SD=5.10) and an average of 30.87 points on the NJA scale (SD=7.14). These 
scores are virtually identical to normative data reported by Cardaciotto and colleagues 
(2008) in the initial PHLMS validation study, which utilized a college student sample 
(PMA, M=36.65, SD=4.93; NJA, M=30.19, SD=5.84). No significant differences related 
to participant gender were found for the PHLMS total score, or either of the two 
subscales. No relationship was found between the two subscale, r(65) = 0.02, p=.87. 
Therefore, the total score was not utilized in further analyses, and the subscale scores 
were used separately to reexamine the primary study hypotheses.  
 The primary study hypotheses were reanalyzed, utilizing PMA and NJA 
separately as the measure of DM. The rationale for these analyses was that one of the 
discrete mindfulness factors might mediate changes in cognitive, affective, and 
physiological changes, whereas the single factor MAAS did not. As analyses related to 
the main study hypotheses required participants to be divided into groups of either high 
or low DM based on their scores on mindfulness measures, median splits were performed 
on PHLMS subscale scores to create these groups 
 For the PMA subscale, a median split was performed to divide participants into 
groups of either high or low DM based on their PMA subscale scores. The PMA median 





became the high DM group, and those categorized as low scorers (N=36) became the low 
DM group. There was a significant difference between the mean scores of these two 
groups, t(65) = -9.80, p <.001. On average, participants categorized through the median 
split as the high DM group received a PMA subscale score of 40.71 (SD=3.20), while the 
mean PMA subscale score for the low DM group was 32.92 (SD=3.29).  To test 
Hypothesis 1, a 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM/PMA) mixed factorial ANOVA was 
conducted to examine group differences in pre- and post-stressor Ospan performance. 
Test condition (i.e. pre- vs post-stressor) and DM/PMA category (i.e. high vs low) served 
as grouping variables, with Ospan total recall scores served as the dependent variable.  To 
test Hypothesis 2, a 2 (Test condition) x 2 (DM/PMA) mixed factorial ANOVA was 
conducted. Test condition (i.e. pre- or post-stressor) and DM category (i.e. high or low) 
served as the grouping variables. NA scores served as the dependent variable. No 
significant findings related to mediation resulted from the analyses of either of these two 
hypotheses. The previously reported significant differences between pre- and post-
stressor Ospan scores and NA were maintained. Table 3 and Table 4 contain the relevant 
data and are presented below. 
 Due to missing physiological data, a second median split was performed in order 
to test for the third study hypothesis related to changes in HR. The remaining 49 
participants with physiological data yielded a median of 36 on the PMA subscale. High 
and low DM group mean scores were quite similar to the findings of the previous median 
split for the final sample (High, M=40.67, SD=3.31; Low, M=33.48, SD=2.91), and the 





condition) x 2 (DM/PMA) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine group 
differences in pre- and stressor HR. Test condition (i.e. pre- vs stressor) and DM/PMA 
category (i.e. high vs low) served as grouping variables, with HR as the dependent 
variable.  No significant findings were produced. Data relevant to these analyses of 
mindfulness and HR are presented in Table 5.  
 For the NJA subscale, the same median split procedure was performed, this time 
utilizing the NJA subscale median of 32. Those categorized as high scorers (N=31; 
M=31.17, SD=0.95) became the high DM group, and those categorized as low scorers 
(N=36; M=30.52, SD=8.69) became the low DM group. There was no significant 
difference between the mean scores of these two groups, t(65) = 0.37, p =.71. As no 
significant difference occurred between these two groups, they were not used in further 
analysis of the primary study hypotheses.  
Table 3 
 
Test Condition x DM (PMA) Factorial Analysis of Variance for Ospan Scores 
 Df F Mean Square P 
(A) Test 
Condition 
1 10.68 65.94 <.01 
(B) DM 1 1.31 43.07 .26 
A x B 
(interaction) 
1 2.79 16.94 .10 
Error (within 
groups) 

















Test Condition x DM (PMA) Factorial Analysis of Variance for PANAS NA 
 Df F Mean Square P 
(A) Test 
Condition 
1 12.98 133.83 <.01 
(B) DM 1 0.12 2.43 .75 
A x B 
(interaction) 





64    
Table 5 
 
Test Condition x DM (PMA) Factorial Analysis of Variance for HR 
 Df F Mean Square P 
(A) Test 
Condition 
1 12.98 133.83 <.01 
(B) DM 1 0.12 2.43 .75 
A x B 
(interaction) 
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monthly lectures by mental health professionals from the 
surrounding area 
 Taught a 6 week clinical interviewing course to first year Clinical 
Psychology graduate students  
 Organized full day workshop on PTSD for mental health providers 
in the Louisville community through the Center for Deployment 
Psychology 







05/2012 – 5/2013 
Fort Knox Department of Behavioral Health  
Fort Knox, KY 
Supervisor: Charles G. Thomas, PsyD  
 Conducted individual therapy with male and female active duty US 
Army soldiers and family members of diverse ethnicities and 
backgrounds 
 Observed and participated in hospital-return, fit-for-duty, and intake 
evaluations 
 Co-led therapy groups for US Army soldiers experiencing 
deployment-related psychopathology and substance abuse-related 
difficulties 
 Worked with an interdisciplinary treatment team, including civilian 
and US Army psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and 
nurse practitioners 
16 hours per week 
 
05/2011 – 08/2011 
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center  
Louisville, KY 
Supervisor: Marilyn Wagner, PhD  
 Administered, scored, and interpreted neuropsychological 
assessment batteries for veterans of various generations, 
ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds 
 Completed integrated reports detailing conclusions drawn from 
cognitive and personality assessment measure 
 Conducted feedback sessions with veterans and their family 
members, outlining findings of the assessment and providing 
recommendations based on these findings 
16 hours per week 
 
08/2011 – 12/2011 
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center  
Louisville, KY 
Supervisor: Steve Bliss, PhD  
 Conducted group therapy with residents and intensive outpatient 
program members at the Louisville VAMC Substance Abuse 
Treatment Clinic & Substance Abuse Residential Rehabilitation 
Treatment Program 
 Led a weekly one hour process group with veterans of various 
generations, ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds 
 Co-led a weekly two hour process group containing both residents 





 Attended interdisciplinary treatment team meetings and assisted with 
treatment planning for SAATRP residents  
8 hours per week 
 
12/2008 – 05/2010 
Eastern Kentucky University Psychology Clinic 
Richmond, KY 
Clinician  
Supervisors: Don Beal, PhD, Robert Brubaker, PhD, Theresa Botts, PhD, 
and Dustin Wygant, PhD 
 Completed over 60 hours of individual therapy with children and 
adults using behavioral and cognitive-behavioral techniques 
 Conducted intake interviews and administered intellectual, 
psychological, and personality assessments 
6 hours per week 
 
01/2010 – 05/2010 
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
Louisville, KY 
Masters Internship Student 
Supervisors: Marilyn Wagner, PhD & Katie LeSauvage, PsyD 
 Conducted individual and group therapy for veterans of various 
generations, ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds and 
performed intake assessments 
 Trained in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and co-led two 
ACT groups for veterans struggling with depression 
 Administered, scored, and interpreted neuropsychological 
assessment batteries  
 Conducted clinical interviews with veterans of various generations, 
ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds  
 Performed assessments for differential diagnosis of veterans of 
various generations, ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds  
 Completed integrated reports detailing conclusions drawn from 
scores received during their neuropsychological assessments  
40 hours per week 
 
08/2009 – 12/2009 
CAFÉ Research Lab 
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 
Practicum Student  
Supervisor:  L. Kevin Chapman, PhD 
 Administered the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM IV 
to adults and children, as well as multiple self-report measures of 





 Scored and interpreted the Symptom Checklist-90, the 
Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children, the Beck Youth 
Inventories, and the Resiliency Scales for Children and 
Adolescents 
 Conducted statistical analysis of data collected from clinical 
interviews and assessment results  
20 hours per week 
 
01/2009 – 05/2009 
Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
Louisville, KY 
Practicum Student 
Supervisor: Jeanne Bennett, PsyD. 
 Administered, scored, and interpreted neuropsychological 
assessment batteries within the Polytrauma Clinic 
 Conducted clinical interviews with veterans of various generations, 
ethnicities, conflicts, and service backgrounds  
 Completed integrated reports for several patients detailing 
conclusions drawn from scores received during their 
neuropsychological assessments  
16 hours per week 
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